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I 
"Praxis, "extasy", "subjective realism", 
"authenticity" all refer to an image of 
man that would underline his existential 
integrity, his freedom to risk, and the 
moral nature of his responsibility, and 
would grant his history a fundamental 
direction and relevance. It is a portrait 
that I would honor. But it is not one 
that should drive us from methodological 
surefootedness, away from the patient 
and precise ordering of the given empirical 
world toward a well-intentioned but woolly-
headed confusion of tongues." 1 
Robert Friedrichs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The thesis takes departure from Robert Friedrichs' text 
A Sociology of Sociology which appeared in 1970. 1 In this 
book, Friedrichs claims that the use of dialectical notions 
in sociology is becoming so prevalent as to suggest that a 
new 'dialectical paradigm' might be in the ascendant. His 
argument, though impressionistic, makes persuasive reading. 
But how valid is the momentous claim contained in it? 
Would it survive an independent assessment of contemporary 
dialectical writing in sociology? 
The delineation of this project opens up yet further 
questions: Which species or meaning of paradigm does 
Friedrichs have in mind? How would one isolate and discuss 
1. 
such a paradigm anyway? And how determine what in the 
literature would be pertinent to such an assessment? Each 
of these will be answered as the thesis proceeds, but first, 
it is necessary to return to some basic definitions. 
the meanings of 'paradigm' 
The notion of 'paradigm' was first introduced into the 
philosophy of science with Thomas Kuhn's essay The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions (1962) . 2 Although it has been 
argue c that Kuhn employed no less than twenty-one senses 
of the term in that book,3 and although Kuhn himself has 
since revised his conception of it,4 the present thesis 
derives from the explicit definition given the term in the 
1962 essay . 
By using the term 'paradigm', Kuhn wrote, I mean to 
suggest 
., . accepted examples of actual scientific 
practice - examples which include law, 
theory, application and instrumentation 
together - [and] provide models from which 
spring particular coherent traditions of 
scientific research. 5 
The words "accepted" and "actual scientific practice' are 
significant here, for they underline Kuhn's interest in 
the sociological as opposed to logical nature of scientific 
activity. The paradigm operates within the scientific 
community shaping the habits of its members with an 
institutional determinism. Entry into the community 
follows on socialization and professional initiation 
rites which ensure the perpetuation of the established 
paradigmatic world view. 
The study of paradigms ... is what mainly 
prepares the student for membership ... 
he there joins men who learned the basis 
of their field from the same concrete 
models, his subsequent practice will 
seldom evoke overt disagreement over 
fundamentals. Men whose research is 
based on shared paradigms are committed 
to the same rules and standards for 
scientific practice. 6 
This sociological emphasis is part of the reason why Kuhn 
prefers the term paradigm to theory, for, " ... as a locus 
of professional commitment (the paradigm is) prior to the 
various concepts, laws, theories and points of view that 
may be extracted from it.,,7 
The second point of emphasis stems from Kuhn's 
repetitious use of the word "example" in his definition. 
For though the paradigm may be prior to theory it does 
provide 'a model' around which a coherent tradition will 
2. 
grow. What exactly is this more concrete aspect? Kuhn 
talks about 
. .. exemplary observations and experiments 
. .. sufficiently unprecedented to attract 
an enduring group of adherents away from 
competing modes of scientific activity ... 
sufficiently open ended to leave all sorts 
of problems for the redefined group of 
practitioners to solve . .. ~ 
Elsewhere he mentions concrete puzzle-solutions, tricks, 
devices and kinds of apparatus. In his 1969 Postscript to 
3. 
the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
he develops the exemplary aspect of the paradigm and names 
it "an ex mplar". His new claim is that although a paradigm 
may already inform scientific inquiry, only the emergence 
of an exemplar marks the advent of mature science. Whereas 
the paradigm has represented " ... the entire constellation 
of beliefs, values , techniques and so on shared by the 
members of a scientific communi ty,,9 the exemplar replaces 
all this. Now there is no longer any need for explicit 
rules of procedure. 
Kuhn seems to be suggesting that in the earlier stages 
of a science the constellation of beliefs and values , a 
paradigm's metaphysical focus is predominant. But this 
poses a difficulty, because he has already asserted that 
the exemplary precedes the theoretical. Which facet of 
the paradigm comes first, or which of its meanings is the 
proper one - those questions constitute another debate. 
It suffices here to observe that the metaphysical sense 
of the paradigm, what Masterman has identified as "a general 
epist mological viewpoint", "a philosophy" or "something 
4. 
which defines a broad sweep of reality" 10 is the aspect 
of Kuhn's work that most scholars have attended to. 
Tracing the dynamics of the paradigm Kuhn writes" 
the successive transition from one paradigm to another via 
revolution is the usual developmental pattern of mature 
science."ll The paradigm, in as much as it defines problems, 
may tend to block the scientist's perception of anomaly in 
his field. But if the anomaly persists, a new framework 
or gestalt will eventually be put forward to account for 
it. If the postulated alternative is strongly supported 
by the evidence, the discipline may be polarised between 
competing frames of reference. Even a multiplicity of 
incommensurable paradigms can appear during this critical 
phase, but generally one particular view will find more 
'converts' than the rest. Consolidation will begin again 
and another period of normal scientific progress will 
become possible. 
paradigms and sociology 
Kuhn's thesis was built around his reading of the history 
of the natural sciences, but there have been several attempts 
to extend it to social science. Effrat's article 'Power to the 
Paradigms' (1973) and Ritzer's 'Sociology: A Multiple-Paradigm 
Science' (1975) are two examples of this, but Friedrichs' book 
is the most comprehensive in scope. 12 Friedrichs argues that 
the term 'paradigm' 
... has become particularly popular among 
sociologists of late because it communicates 
the notion expressed by the term 'model' 
without invoking that word's physical imagery. 
A paradigm is an 'example', but one that is 
typically linguistic in base rather than 
physical, a conceptual reference 
rather than a perceptual one. But 
it is a prime example that serves as 
a common frame of reference, 'a 
definition of the situation' that 
provides a basic focus of orientation. 
Normal science proceeds within the 
confines of a single paradigm, a 
relatively 'classic' study or experiment 
that has been sufficiently compelling 
to shape a discipline's sense of where 
its problems lie, what its appropriate 
tools and methods are, and the kinds of 
solutions for which it might settle. It 
is grasped before a c o nceptual schema, 
a 'law', a theory or a se t of methodo-
logical postulates are articulated, and 
communicates' a s nse o f the real' that 
elicits commitment and out of which 
further commitments are then drawn. 13 
Friedrichs assumes that sociology is now "a mature 
science" that owes its paradigmatic consolidation to the 
shift in focus from social action to system which came 
5. 
about during the decade of the Fifties. The new 'structural-
functional' analysis of Parsons, Davis , Romans and others 
coincided with, and was reinforced by, the growth of 
computer science and cybernetic theory. Culturally , this 
was a period of cold-war conservatism and home front 
pragmatism, a static era. The practitioners of sociology 
were beginning to conceive of themselves as professionals 
and the prevailing social-systems theory provided them with 
a suitable creed. 
Yet there were others, such as the conflict theorists, 
the Freudians, behaviourists, phenomenologists and writers 
on alienation, who stood out from the gen e ral trend. In 
fact, Friedrichs is obliged to comment that for some reason, 
perhaps because of the peculiar logic of the social sciences 
and their inextricable connection with human values, the 
6. 
same degree of commitment to a single paradigm is rarely 
manifest by them. The most significant anomaly to appear 
concerned the failure of the systems paradigm to account 
for change - the issue of social dynamics. And so, guided 
by Mills and Dahrendorf, the conflict image was to become 
a strong contender for theoretical supremacy, leaving the 
discipline polarised in revolutionary struggle. Meanwhile, 
true to the observation of Kuhn , the critical phase generated 
a frantic self-searching as sociologists turned to explore 
their philosophical and methodological roots. At this 
point the sociology of sociology was born. 
The Sixties opened with a mood of ideological dissention, 
political activism, social unrest and a search for cultural 
alternatives. The New Left revived curiosity in what the 
humanistic Marx had had to say, and professionally , the 
international sociological establishment was making moves 
to bridge the post-war ideological gap between East and West. 
The sociolist of sociology therefore, 
began to suspect that the dialectic 
unencumbered by a special ideological 
cast, might provide a strikingly 
"functional" alternative to a choice 
between system and conflict as the 
sixties moved in to the seventies. 14 
'the dialectical paradigm' 
A dialectical paradigm would be an open commitment, 
writes Friedrichs, which 
... like the paradigm of "democracy" in 
the truly pluralistic state, grants a 
place to competing paradigms, if but a 
secondary place. 15 
In entertaining the possibility of such a paradigm, however, 
Friedrichs recognises that he is parting company with Kuhn. 
For til theory of r current scientific revolutions become now 
a theory of complementarity and epistemological pluralism. 
Scanning the sociological literature in support of 
his argument for the ascendant paradigm, Friedrichs finds 
that already four thinkers have worked out a social 
philosophy based on the dialectic - Gurvitch, Sartre, 
Berger and Luckmann, each in his own way intensely concerned 
with the interpenetration of the subjective and objective 
phases of social reality. Others like Schelsky, Adorno 
and Dahrendorf preoccupied with this interaction of the 
two, analogous to quantum mechanics, are led "in some of 
their minds" into an impractical transcendentalism. Yet 
others, while actually adhering to the systems paradigm 
underscore the importance of polarities in sociology, Kuhne, 
for example, and Bendix and Berger, Moore, Gross and 
Jedrzejewski. In Tiryakian, Friedrichs observes "a 
dialectical relationship between the qualitative and 
guantitative that would appear akin to that found in 
Marxist theory." The phenomenologist Schlitz, he notes, 
comprehends the problems of everyday life as dialectical, 
while Mead's genesis of the subjective 'I' from the 
objective 'Me' implies a dialectic of emergence. Even 
mainstream American sociologists, such as van den Berghe 
and Loomis , are found playing about with dialectical notions 
like negation. Some among them, notably Simpson and Yinger, 
Werkmeister, Barber and Streeton appreciate the implications 
of recognising knowledge as an active variable in research -
Merton's "self-fulfilling prophecy". Barrington-Moore goes 
7. 
so far as to suggest that Hegelian logic is a more 
appropriate basis for social science. Finally, Friedrichs 
points out, there exists in the work of Mannheim and of 
Seeley, a dialectic of social enlightenment and societal 
reconstruction, which will emancipate man from the 
compulsions of culture. 16 
Friedrichs believes that the fundamental reason why 
"a dialectical posture is likel y to gain a respectable 
hearing in the decade ahead" is that it examines the 
relationship between scientific subject and scientific 
object. The image the social scientist has of himself 
as agent necessarily affects the sort of sociology he 
engages in. Kuhn , extrapolating from the natural sciences 
had no need to accommodate this dimension within his theory. 
So Friedrichs departs from Kuhn yet again, and formulates 
his notion of first and second order paradigms. 
The paradigms that order a sociologist's 
conception of his subject matter ... may 
themselves be a reflection or function 
of a more fundamental image: a paradigm 
in terms of which he sees himself.17 
Somewhat carried away with his own rhetoric perhaps, 
Friedrichs adds "I would expect and encourage a pluralism 
at the level of self image, just as, '" at the level of 
substantive paradigm. II18 This recommendation will not be 
explored. 
Friedrichs' innovation, the primary paradigm, rests 
on the philosophic concept · of the reflexive, and this is 
the rationale behind his demand for reappraisal of the 
identification of the logic of the natural and social 
8. 
sciences. Awareness of the findings of social science may 
enhance control of the environment, but tbe same awareness 
also introduces the possibility of the negation of what 
has just been reliably established. Friedrichs decries 
the attempts of his predecessors in the sociology of 
knowledge to determine once and for all a stable matrix 
that can be called "social reality". In his view, they 
have succumbed to Comte's view of the sociologist who 
would "voir pour prevoir", "prevoir pour prevenir". Thus 
conceived, the sociologist's role is one of collating 
sequences constant over time, yet 
... the very discovery of an order in the 
realm of the social must inevitably, by 
the grammar that adheres to social or 
behavioural research, act to some degree 
as a new and unique element in the stream 
of empirical events that make up human 
interaction. No matter what uniformities 
one uncovers in the activities of sub-
atomic particles or in the chemical 
processes involved in the life history 
of the cell, that knowledge by itself 
would appear to have no effect upon the 
order that has been perceived ... we may, 
of course, consciously act to alter the 
arrangement and prevalence of the 
particular atomic or chemical processes 
of which we have become aware. But such 
action in no way reduces the fundamental 
reliability of the order revealed. 
This is not the case at the social level. 
The simple knowledge of a given empirical 
sequence is a cognitive factor, interactive 
with the cognitive, affective or evaluational 
factors that are part of the societal 
matrix ... which includes both the researcher 
and his subjects, transforming it in some 
measure from the matrix that might have 19 
been, if the orde~ had not been revealed. 
The "pr~voir" is thus, inadvertantly or otherwise, overtaken 
by the "prevenir". 
9. 
The new and unique element defies definition as a 
systemic feedback phenomenon because it cannot "in principle" 
be accounted for by prior programming. Friedrichs specifies 
"le arning" and mans' capaci ty to manipulate his knowledge 
as the basic process which makes possible this fracture 
with repetition, this unpredictablity of events at the human 
level. Knowledge is no longer seen as a dependent variable 
but is now potentially an independent variable in any 
situation. This means that all research becomes essentially 
action research. 
The logic of the natural sciences which rests on order 
and repetition has no application here, and by extension 
the search for fundamental laws of human action, laws 
governing peculiarly social events, is a meaningless one. 
These things are idiophenomena. 
The involvement of subject and object which the 
reflexive dialectical position entails leads into philo-
sophical paradox persuading Friedrichs that Hegel's logical 
formulation of thesis-anti thesis-synthesis may well provide 
the most appropriate grounding for the new paradigm. 20 At 
the same time however, he takes care to distinguish this 
from its materialist application in the natural sciences. 
Marx, Engels and Lenin had stressed the existence of 'an 
objective reality' independent of the human mind. A truly 
dialectical sociology, Friedrichs reminds us, is concerned 
with "an examination of the relationship between sociology 
and the sociologist as subject.,,21 
10. 
the problem - testing Friedrichs' claim 
This, in outline, is Friedrichs' argument for a 
dialectical sociology. The problem is to test his claim 
that the use of dialectical ideas in sociology will become 
such as to constitute a paradigm. As he puts it "if the 
dialectic does not seriously challenge system and conflict 
for paradigmatic status, during the 1970's, it will not be 
because of inadequate formal crede ntials.,,22 This is not 
made any easier by the fact that neither terms - 'dialectic' 
or 'paradigm', receive precise definition in A Sociology 
of Sociology. The introductory definition of a paradigm 
that Friedrichs gives his readers weighs heavily on the 
exemplary aspect of the word . The book itself, predictably 
leans towards its sociological sense. Only the summary of 
the work presented in the British Journal of Sociology 
(1972) leaves no doubt that has prime concern has been 
to elucidate the epistemological problems of the discipline. 
It is a metaphysical paradigm that we will be looking for. 
Now although Kuhn's revised work does spell out some 
f h . f d' 29 . th o t e component characteristlcs 0 para 19ms, nel er 
Kuhn nor Friedrichs have articulated the metaphysical 
paradigm in any systematic way. A methodical examination 
of Friedrichs' hypothesis thus requires that an appropriate 
framework of analysis representing a set of paradigmatic 
features, be developed and applied to his and other 
dialectical writing, in order, as the positivist would 
1l. 
say 'to hold the material constant'. This exercise coincides 
with the second unresolved difficulty introduced by Friedrichs , 
the undefined nature of the term 'dialectic'. The present 
essay does not start with a prior commitement to any 
particular brand of dialectic nor to dialectics in general. 
Rather, it is anticipated that a common definition, which 
condenses the contemporary meanings of the term, will 
emerge from the systematic comparison of authors undertaken 
with the analytic framework. 
rationale and instrument 
Patently, such a framework sho uld consist of a list 
12. 
of the categories commonly used in the philosophy of social 
science for drawing distinctions between pehnomena and the 
ways in which they are regarded. Hence a wide reading has 
been involved, but ultimately, it was the straight forward 
texts like Nagel's The Structure of Science (1961), Bunge's 
Causality (1959), Gibson's The Logic of Social Inquiry (1960), 
Kaplan's The Conduct of Inquiry (1964), and two more recent 
works in the philosophy of social science Radnitsky's 
Continental Schools of Metascience (1968) and O'Neill's 
collection of famous essays republished under the title 
Modes of Individualism and Collectivism (1973) which proved 
most useful. Yet these works, with the exception of 
Radnitsky's book, provided epistemological categories 
which described only conventional social science. ew 
dimensions appropriate to a dialectical epistemology had 
to be added. A comprehensive list of these was compiled 
after an acquaintance with the literature of the tradition 
had been made. Hall's article on 'Dialectic' in the 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967) was a helpful introduction 
to this, as it traces the career of the term from antiquity 
through to Kant and Hegel. Selsam and Martel's Reader in 
Marxist Philosophy (1963) with selections from Marx, Engels 
and Lenin covered its materialist phase. From here it 
became a matter of reading contemporary works such as 
Lefebvre's Logique formelle, logique dialectique (1940), 
Sartre's The problem of method (1960), Marcuse's One 
Dimensional Man (1964), Habermas' Knowledge and Human 
Interests (1968), Althusser's For 1arx (1966), and Levi-
Strauss' Structural Anthropology (1963). One further 
article which pin-pointed some characteristics of the 
mode was Schneiders' 'Dialectic in Sociology' published 
in the American Sociological Review (1971). 
The categories of the analytic framework are not 
logically exclusive items, the philosophical alignment 
of a sociologist influences his metaphysics or ontology 
13. 
and this in turn, shapes his epistemology or the methodology 
he attempts to apply to this reality. These cardinal 
positions give rise to yet further items, each of which 
is included on the framework so that the deeper consistency 
of 'the paradigm' can be examined. Hence one would expect 
to find an overall pattern running through an author's 
attitude to the exact sciences; to value freedom and 
generalization; in his view of the nature of determination; 
the type of explanation he considers appropriate; its 
focus-cause, meaning or other factor; its purpose or 
outcome; his choice of method - empirical or hermeneutic, 
diachronic or synchronic; whether he regards the dialectic 
as a method, as part of some external reality, or both; 
14. 
his attitude to formal logic; to the 'laws' of dialectics 
and wh re he locates th dialectic in social reality. 
Such a frame should not be regarded as a definitive 
list but rather as an arbitrary, if reasonable, device 
allowing comparative statements to be made. A closer 
acquaintance with the material to be examined may suggest 
that additional dimensions be included - the 'dialectical 
paradigm' if one exists, is an uncertain quantity at this 
stage. The rationale for the use of such a frame is this: 
the derived set of categories or features represents one 
axis, A, of a contingency table, of which the second axis, 
B, includes each of the dialecticians under review. Each 
author can be assessed for the presence (X) or absence (0) 
of a specific characteristic and ultimately the commonality 
of the body of writing reviewed becomes apparent. 
This method, though a form of content analysis is 
open to computer treatment. It closely resembles the 
clumping process used by taxonomists in the natural sciences, 
since the questions 'does this group of plants constitute 
a species' and does this group of social theories constitute 
a paradigm' are clearly parallel in form. In numerical 
taxonomy, 
Classifications based on many characters 
are called 'polythetic'. They do not 
require anyone character or property 
to be universal for a class ... In such 
cases a given 'taxon' or class is 
established because it contains a 
substantial portion of the characters 
employed in the classification. Assign-
ment to a given taxon is not on the 
basis of a single property but on the 
aggregate of properties ... ?5 
In this case the analysis proceeds from face valid 
or non-numerically determined clusters or groups of 
authors. For purposes of definition an item is considered 
representative of a given group of dialecticians if two-
thirds of the authors in that group acknowledge it. If 
a representative item is shared by two-thirds of the groups, 
then it is interpreted as a paradigmatic feature. If two-
thirds of the total number of items listed on the analytic 
frame are paradigmatic features so defined, then a common 
paradigm will be said to be present. 
15. 
Unavoidably an element of subjective discrimination 
enters this process with the decision over the applicability 
of a given category to a given entity. In the case of 
authors, who are 'temporal entities' it can become extremely 
difficult to make the appropriate judgement. An author may 
entertain different theories at different stages of his 
career. The commitment to one position at a certain stage 
in his thought may have no more significance than that it 
serves as a launching pad for yet a further development 
which contradicts it. At times, a statement can be made 
which, on the face of it indicates a clear commitment to 
a particular position, but, given a knowledge of the whole 
output, the statement itself may be in fact a falsification 
of his views. Inference becomes necessary. 
Authors, being human, are also fallible. It is 
reasonable to expect that they will sometimes omit 
consideration of significant issues and so some categories 
will remain inappropriate in both the X and the 0 sense. 
16. 
They may also be inconsistent, so that two analytically 
related categories may yet have to be marked X and 0 or 
two categories with contradictory implications marked X 
and X. Inference may at times be unavoidable, but the 
basis of each judgement may be made explicit by placing 
the relevant category number in brackets beside the phrase 
in the text which has indicated it. 
It is this qualitative aspec t of the sorting process , 
a prerequisite to coding material for objective, mec hanical 
analysis by computer, that calls into question the usefulness 
of the latter. It might be described as the dialectic of 
the inverse relationship between meaningfulness and 
certainty. Once a computerized classification has been 
established, it still remains to 'understand' why the 
relationships between entities are the way they are. For 
this reason, while the basic rationale of quantitative 
taxonomy is followed here, the present analysis will be 
made 'by hand', thus preserving a breadth of comprehension 
and a flexibility that is not available through the computer. 
the case of Freidrichs 
... a classificatory procedure must be 
outlined in such a form that any scientist 
or a properly programmed computer can 
carry out the indicated operations and 
given the same input data arrive at the 
same results. 24 
The categories and method of analysis are introduced 
by articulating the paradigmatic features of Friedrichs' 
own tacit epistemology. Most of the categories are familiar 
or self explanatory, where uncommon notions are used 
additional commentary is introduced. 
17. 
category 1 a) no philosophical alignment 
b) has philosophy but non-1arxist 
c) aligns with Hegel/early Marx 
d) aligns with orthodox Marxism 
The philosophical alignment appropriate to the new paradigm 
is, Freidrichs believes, rooted in Hegel and the young larx 
(lc), whose manuscripts began to appear in English only in 
the late Fifties " ... philosophers have only interpreted 
the world, the point is to chang e it.,,25 " Alienated" social 
science traditionally turned both the practitioners and 
the subject-objects of research into "things", gaining a 
falsified knowledge in the process. The function of the 
new dialectical sociology comments Friedrichs, is to 
'liberate' men: an existential dimension complements 
the empirical exercise. 
category 2 a) there is a unity of the sciences 
b) sociological methods are distinct 
The positivists' unified sciences ideal, where explanation 
is envisaged in terms of reduction to the discipline 
immediately below it in the epistemological hierarchy , 
is for Friedrichs, an untenable aspiration. For Friedrichs, 
following in the tradition of Dilthey, the logics of the 
natural and social sciences are qualitatively distinct (2b). 
"I have never claimed that there was complete symmetry 
between the biography of a social science even as sociology 
and any of the natural sciences, indeed the nature of their 
fundamental disparity is the central message of my book.,,26 
18. 
category 3 a) reality is here and now, actual, objective 
b) reality is relative to the perceiver 
c) reality is negation, potential, essence 
The essentialist metaphysic, as opposed to the naive realist 
or positive one, comes from Hegel. In his theory critical 
Reason was juxtaposed to the faculty of the Understanding 
which, he said, perceived only in terms of 'given' common 
sense categories 'a reality' of determinate things and 
existences. These 'actualities', in fact merely appearances 
and contingencies, were confused with 'the real' while the 
essential qualities, the changing realtions, the immanent , 
possible and necessary qualities of the matter were dis-
regarded. For the Hegelian, reality is never given but 
is the negation of the world of appearances. For him, the 
product of 'empirical' perception is a static, passive and 
superficial world view. And because it lacks grasp of the 
compulsive inherence of change, its practical implications 
are conservative. 27 
The notion of subjective relativism is plain enough, 
but the term here applies also, to theories in which 
reality is "intersubjectively constituted". 
Friedrichs' statement on the nature of social reality 
vacillates. On the one hand he dissociates his notion of 
the dialectic from the materialists' who maintains that 
reality exists independent of mans' capacity to grasp it. 
" ... neither Marx, Engels nor Lenin subscribed to the logic 
I have put forth ... ~25 Yet he sees the empirical approach 
of the objectivists as complementary to the hermeneutic 
one in sociology and the two "alternating lenses" related 
as "nested frames". " ... we should never allow ourselves 
to ignore the fact that a nested hierarchy of lenses -
one artificial and one given - is the more fundamental 
epistemological paradigm. ,,28 His recommendations that 
the dialectical sociologist operate from within a plurality 
of self images coincides with an epistemological relativism 
(3b). Finally, his acceptance of the reflexive 
and emergent character of reality implies a commitment 
19. 
to the essentialist view - one whe r e potential, the negation 
of the 'here and now' appearances or actualities is the 
fundamental condition (3c). 
category 4 a) sociology is a value free activity 
b) sociology is committed 
On the question of value freedom, Friedrichs is plainly 
in favour of the committed stance in social research (4b). 
"It should be abundantly clear by now that those involved 
in social research are incapable, even in principle, of 
disengaging themselves ... ,,29 
category 5 a) sociology is a nomothetic discipline 
b) sociology is idiographic 
c) both complement each other 
Friedrichs envisages a dual epistemology, where "the 
ideographic in human experience ... is in dynamic relationship 
to the nomothetic . .. ,,30(5c). Elsewhere, however , he 
writes that "conceptual closure, violates the openness 
of dialectical theory,,,31 and that " ... the search for 
"laws" of human nature and for fundamental social processes 
that are in principle stable is ultimately destined to 
be futile.,,32 
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category 6 a) explanation is deductive 
b) it is probabilistic 
c) it is functional 
d) it is genetic 
e) it is dialectical 
In the tradition of Hempel 33 the essential characteristic 
of formal deductive explanation can be said to be that the 
explanandum is a logically necessary consequent of the 
premises or explanans, which assert sufficient and sometimes 
necessary conditions for its occurrence. In order to 
predict, it is necessary to have explained deductively. 
Probabilistic or inductive statistical explanation 
may permit predictions of events within certain limits of 
probability, but at its weakest it suggests mere tendencies. 
Functional explanation is teleological, and characte r-
istically identiTies as the cause of an event some end-state 
of the system of which that event is a part. 
In genetic explanation each stage is linked to its 
successor by means of a general principle which makes the 
occurrence of the latter a likely probability given the 
former. 
A definition of dialectical explanation is hard to 
come by, however Bunge recognises it as a possibility. 
Typically dialectical explanation consists 
in the exposure of inward and outward 
conflicts that keep certain processes 
running, or that bring about the emergence 
of entities endowed with new qualities ... 
dialectical explanations employ some 
other categories of determination such 
as interaction and causation ... ~4 
Allardt points out that dialectical explanation falls midway 
I . 35 between causal and finalistic or teleological exp anatlon. 
Friedrichs speaks of dialectical explanation in these 
terms (6e): 
Whenever a social scientist does isolate 
a specific manifestation of order in the 
social world, his awareness of that 
order represents an entirely new factor 
in that world and will feed back, through 
his own a c tions and the actions of those 
to whom he communicates that awareness, 
to deny to some degree the full validity 
of that order in the future. 36 
category 7 a) the outcome of explanation is prediction 
b) the outcome of explanation (or description) 
is understanding 
c) the outcome of understanding is action 
Explanation and description are not cl e arly distinguished 
by Friedrichs whose historical leaning is strong. He sees 
the goal of understanding as consciousness raising - an 
21. 
enlightened awareness of the human condition with liberating 
or "therapeutic" social action as its consequence (7c). 
category 8 a) sociological methods are empirical 
b) are hermeneutic or interpretive 
c) both methods complement each other 
Friedrichs observes that both methods are used and that 
they complement each other (8c) . 
.. . scientists and non-scientists alike -
register experiences that cluster about 
the complementary poles of the intra-
subjective and the intersubjective, the 
unique and the recurrent, the existential 
and the rational. Given a preference for 
efficient prediction, some ... will use a 
polarised lens to filter out the first 
of each pair, and focus simply upon the 
second, projecting order over time in 
the manner of science. Given the opposite 
aim - the delineation of the intra-
subjective, unique and existential in 
experience - a complementary lens may 
be substituted that blocks the opposite 
polarities ... ~7 
category 9 social analysis seeks causes 
category 10 seeks meanings or reasons for action 
category 11 seeks immanent factors 
22. 
While Friedrichs insists that both empirical and hermeneutic 
methods play complementary roles in social research, he 
plays up the importance of human meaning and the reasons 
for action (10) rather than the causal properties of social 
situations. The immanent is also acknowledged however (11); 
for along with Mead, Friedrichs would go 
... beyond the natural scientific 
assumption that effects could at 
least in principle be reduced to 
their causes, by arguing that there 
was in the effect an 'emergent' that 
in turn would condition the context 
such that the so-called 'effect' was 
incapable of being deduced from the 
so-called 'cause' .38 
category 12 there are latent and manifest meaning levels 
Friedrichs appreciates the problem of alienation, but does 
not explore the related issue of false-consciousness or 
Merton's distinction between latent and manifest meaning 
levels (0). 
category 13 a) subjective factors determine objective ones 
b) objective factors are determinant 
c) both are reciprocally determining 
Friedrichs pulls away from objective determinism in favour 
of an active role for the human subject. The dialectic 
that he advocates nevertheless does involve a reciprocal 
determination (13c). 
23. 
category 14 a) the whole determines the nature of the parts 
b) the parts determine the nature of the whole 
c) part and whole are reciprocally determining 
Item 14a represents the standard functionalist line, but the 
sympathy of the liberal Friedrichs lies more with individual 
part rather than the whole or system . Again, however, 
complementarity is the rule (14c). 
category 15 a) social analysis is diachronic 
b) social analysis is s ynchronic 
c) both complement each o t her 
These are favoured terms of the structuralists, Piaget and 
Levi-Strauss. Friedrichs dismisses static structural or 
synchronic analysis and insists that the social is always 
ongoing and open ended - "a stream of empirical events," 
(15a) . 
category 16 a) the dialectic is a method 
b) the dialectic is reality 
c) it describes both 
d) it describes the interaction of both 
Friedrichs recognises that the term dialectic describes 
both social methods and social reality, and the interaction 
which this implies. " ... the epistemology of our sociological 
calling is as fundamentally interactive , and thus as capable 
of transcending the yoke of compulsive order, as is our 
subj ect matter" (16d). 29 
category 17 a) dialectics rejects formal logic 
b) dialectics uses formal logic 
In Aristotelian logic, the law of identity serves to fix 
a symbol to its referent, A=A. The law of contradiction 
specifies that A and its negation, not -A, cannot overlap , 
because this would challenge the law of identity. The law 
24. 
of the excluded middle asserts that no third term can exist 
between A and not-A. A dialectical logic however, would 
be based on the possibility that A may = not-A. Friedrichs 
believes that formal logic should be supplanted by dialectical 
logic in (some) social analyses (17a). "For Hegel's 
formulation of the thesis-anti thesis-synthesis trinity does 
appear to be the peculiar logic in question ... ~40 A practical 
dialectical logic for sociology has no t yet been devised. 
category 18 a) the motive force in dialectical logic 
is simple contradiction 
b) it is multiple contradiction 
c) it is some other factor 
Conventionally, the dialectic, including Marx's is moved by 
an internal contradiction, that is, a term in logical 
opposition to another. The notions of irony and paradox 
often found in literary allusions to the dialectic are 
corollaries of the logic of contradiction. If two terms 
are opposites in reality then they are contraries (18c) 
not contradictories. Many authors use the term contradiction 
for what should in fact be called a contrary. The analytic 
ratings follow author usage here and not logical usage of 
the term. In other words if an author speaks of contradiction 
he is rated as referring to contradiction even if this is 
in fact a contrary or other factor. Recently, the French 
structuralists who follow Mao Tse Tung in this matter, have 
introduced the notion of multiple contradiction and over-
determination. Friedrichs does not identify a motive force 
of the dialectic but he makes frequent reference to it s 
paradoxical nature (18a). 
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category 19 the dialectic operates at a physical level 
20 at a product ion level 
21 at an institutional level 
22 at an intersubjective level 
23 at an intrasubjective level 
24 at a cognitive level 
25 at a structural (infra) level 
Engels attempted to substantiate the working of the dialectic 
within physics and chemistry. Marx's early usage of the term 
located it at the point of involvement o f man with the 
physical world, that is work, production or praxis, was the 
proto-typical dialectical mode. The interpretation of 
history that was his later pre-occupation, lifted the 
dialectical process to an institutional level where it 
characterized the struggle between social classes. While 
not rejecting the 'macro' historical process, Sartre has 
concentrated on the intersubjective dialectic between 
individuals. In Freud and Mead a dialectic between the 
components of the individual psyche is implicit. To regard 
the dialectic as a thought process is to return to Hegel , 
h d 1 h F t · 41 tough mo ern cognitive psycho ogists suc as es lnger 
would appear to assume a similar phenomenon. The structural-
functional concern is with the institutional level, a by-
product of the collective consciousness. The structural 
dialectic proper is motivated by the essential, immanent 
properties of a collective unconscious, an infra-structural 
model. 
Friedrichs rejects the materialist notion of a dialectic 
operating in nature, and although he does not dismiss the 
·Marxian dialectic at the level of production, his emphasis 
is on a dialectic of the intersubjective and of cognition 
or reflection (22), (24) : " ... social research actually 
stands wi thin the dialectic that is social interaction ... ,.,42 
Gurvitch, Sartre, Berger and Luckmann are his mentors here. 
category 26 the law of the interpenetration of 
opposites is recognised 
27 the negation of the negation is recognised 
28 the law of emergence is recognised 
These 'dialectical laws' which were developed mainly by 
Engels,connect the logic and the ontology of dialectics. 
The law of the interpenetration of opposites entails that 
all entities, being complexes of opposing elements and 
forces, exist in a state of continuous self-transformation. 
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The law of the negation of the negation involves the thesis-
antithesis-synthesis sequence, each synthesis resolving 
the contradictions that emerged during the previous phase. 
The law of emergence or the transformation of quantity to 
quality and vice versa, implies that cumulative quantitative 
change may, once a certain point is reached, precipitate a 
new quality which is not mechanically reducible to the 
matter from which it emerged. 
Although Friedrichs does not list the dialectical laws 
as such, he does acknowledge the significance of polarity, 
interpenetration, negation and emergence in other dialectical 
wr i tin g, ( 26), ( 27 ), ( 28 ) . 
category 29 a) the dialectic relates to a systems model 
b) it relates to a conflict model 
Friedrichs prefers the more 'open' conflict model of society 
(29c) to the systems model. Nevertheless, again he advocates 
~-
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a "dialogical" complementarity of these. "Neither "system" 
nor "conflict" need be denied; rather they become necessary 
elements in a larger dialectical gestalt.,,43 
category 30 a) dialectics offers an exemplar 
b) dialectics is only a perspective 
A Sociolo~~ of Sociology does not pretend to dialectics as 
an exemplar or concrete method of problem solving, it is 
seen only as a perspective (30b). Lat e r work by Friedrichs 
attempts to amend this. 
selection of material 
Having now articulated the features of Friedrichs' 
'dialectical paradigm', it remains to survey contemporary 
dialectical writing, find its common strands, and compare 
this with Friedrichs' vision. 
It will be recalled that the conclusion to his summary 
biography of sociology was the expectation that a dialectical 
paradigm, unencumbered by any ideological cast, should gain 
prominence as the Sixties move into the Seventies. The 
material with which he attempted to demonstrate this 
assertion was however fairly slight. He mentioned four 
acknowledged dialecticians - Gurvitch, Sartre, Berger and 
Luckmann,each of whom show radical variations of approach. 
Three old guard sociologists, Mead, Mannheim and Merton, 
were called in . He listed a group of systems theorists 
interested in dialectical notions such as polarity, negation 
and conflict . The phenomenologists SchUtz and Tiryakian 
were acknowledged, as were the 'transcendentalist' Frankfurt 
group. Finally there were the methodologists, who bad 
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little else in common but the recognition that 'understanding' 
of the nature of events in a social process is 'a new variable' 
which may affect the outcome of that process. All of this 
received additional Significance because it was viewed through 
a cloud of resurgent interest in the humanist writing of the 
young Marx. 
A comprehensive search of the literature beginning with 
the Sociological Abstracts a decade before the appearance of 
A Sociology of Sociology revealed a large amount of material 
that Friedrichs had not accounted for. A cursory review 
however, showed that not all of it was relevant to the project 
,'; 
at hand. The Index to the abstracts conventionally uses two 
headings: Dialectics and Dialectical Materialism. The work 
under the latter head consists in the main of publications 
from the Eastern European journals Sociologicky Casopsis in 
Czech, Sociologija in Serbian, the Vestnik Moskovskogo 
Universiteta and Filosofskye nauki in Russian. An occasional 
article from the West following the Soviet line also appears 
here and so do specific criticisms of Marxist theory. This 
body of work is not appropriate for inclusion in the present 
assessment of the dialectical paradigm though, because in 
Friedrichs' terms, it is not free of an ideological cast. 
Indeed, he goes so far as to say that "The freedom that 
adheres to the fullest application of a dialectical logic 
is no more welcome to the dogmatic materialist than it is 
to the presumptive systems theorist.,,44 And while Friedrichs ~. 
at times entertains the possibility of a convergence of 
i: 
Marxist and non-Marxist sociology under the dialectical 
a-__ ~~  ______________________________ .... ~nn" 
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paradigm, the communist response to this, judging from 
reports of the 1970 International Sociological Association 
Converence at Varna where his thesis was delivered, is one 
of cool indifference. 45 Meanwhile, some of the publications 
listed under Dialectics are consistent in bias and content 
with those under the Diamat classification. It has been 
assumed that these were incorrectly indexed, so these also 
are excluded from the present investigation. 
Several other considerations have shaped the selection 
of material. Works using 'dialectic' in its ancient sense 
of debate or dialogue are omitted. Works in which the 
dialectic refers to a philosophy of history, a theory of 
political or economic change, or a psychological process, 
in other words, where the context of the term is non-
sociological, a publication is eliminated. Criticisms of 
the dialectic are also excluded, because the present search 
is for adherents of the tradition. Secondary sources, reviews 
and evaluations, while not disregarded are used only as points 
of reference for primary dialectical thinkers. Finally, in 
order to tailor the scope of the present investigation, 
which is already wide, no works published before 1960 are 
included for consideration. 
A preliminary reading of the material reveals that the 
dialectic has crossed paths recently with several discrete 
intellectual traditions - existentialist structuralist, 
even functionalist social theorists have toyed with the 
notion. For this reason, the exposition which follows falls 
naturally into a series of chapters each devoted to a 
particular school of thought. A matrix summarising the 
formal characteristics of each author follows each chapter. 
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Hermeneutics is the art of understanding through interpretation. 
The hermeneutic dialectic originates from the Platonic 
dialectical mode which has been described as " ... a movement 
of the mind ... through dialogue and discussion, for the 
clarification of a concept ... ,,46 The process involves a 
"tacking between perspectives" at various "altitudes" of 
1 . , 47 genera lzatl0n. 
In Europe the hermeneutic tradition has joined the 
emancipatory exercise of the sociology of knowledge. American 
interest in it appears to be an expression of homespun 
philosophic pragmatism. 
The first sociologist to write in favour of an hermeneutic 
dialectic was Llewellyn Gross in the American Journal of 
Sociology, 1961. His article, an extended version of a 
conference paper presented to the sociological establishment, 
is entitled 'Preface to a Metatheoretical Framework for 
Sociology' .48 Gross is deeply disturbed by the lack of 
intellectual awareness that marks professional sociology. 
The relevant questions are simply not being asked, he says, 
and he sees his "neo-dialectical framework" as a panacea to 
this, (16a, 24). 
In Gross' view, Hegel and Marx had worked with an 
"historically restricted species of dialecti cal theory".49 
His own more general framework, which might be called 
" 
Ii 
I,' 
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"perspectival assessment" or "contextual appraisal", is 
ancient in its inspiration and involves a procedure whereby 
every problem is confronted by a multiplicity of contending 
and opposing theoretical alternatives (lb). Gross advocates 
imaginative conjecture, rhetoric, non-demonstrative 
inference, and a form of validation that would take into 
account both artistically and scientifically motivated 
endeavour (2b). He does not spell out the details of this 
proposal but admits that it extends well beyond conventional 
rules of logic and criteria of credibility (17a). 
Perspectival assessment is a species of semantic 
clarification. 50 Gross writes that every assertion has 
to deal with an indeterminate range of meanings issuing 
from it, since every concept is itself a composition of 
contexts each calling for assessment. Sentences may appear 
logically contradictory but will not be found to be 
inconsistent in intended meanings after contextual analysis 
of customary usage is carried out (8b), Terms representing 
"dialectical relationships" such as interaction, isolation, 
domination, differentiation, equalization, adaptation, need 
to be tidied up "in respect to contexts of meaning, and 
transitional qualities,,51 lest they be assumed to be "simple 
unilinear processes" (7b), 
The sociologist who is interested in working within 
a neo-dialectical framework should ask the following 
questions according to Gross (30b): 
1. 
2. 
What are the opposites implied by a 
sociological term, proposition or scheme (26)? 
What are the transitional or intermediate 
regions through which opposites are joined 
to one another? 
, 
""-
3. Where are the contexts of opposition and 
apposition that appear at various levels 
of logical and empirical analysis? 
4. What are the methodological and substantive 
principles through which opposites can be 
integrated, synthesized or unified? 
5. What opposites are given priority by being 
treated as premises or antecedents for 
analysis.52 
He recommends this sort of analysis for substantive issues 
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such as associative and dissociative processes: the dynamics 
of attraction and repulsion: work on the convergence of 
modal personalities with socio-cultural prescriptions: and 
the rural urban dichotomy as it affects the community. 
There is an implicit dialectic in sociological writing, 
Gross maintains, and it occurs mainly in symposia, editorials, 
reviews and rejoinders, wherever there is debate, actual 
or contrived and analysis of coincidence and divergence. 
However, when Gross proceeds to record what he considers 
are the "neo-dialectical instances" in sociological theory, 
then his understanding of the notion stretches towards some 
sort of dialectic beyond the purely semantic function. 
He begins with Bendix and Berger's exploration of 
"polar concepts" in sociology (26). Of more interest though, 
are the writers he sees as tending to use "a broader 
dialectical reference": Mannheim, for example, who sought 
objectivity through a "synthesis" of perspectives and whose 
ideology and utopia were "ideas which transcend the existing 
social order" (28): Simmel, who viewed "conflict as unity" 
(29c): Sorokin, with his cultural systems (29c) ideational, 
sensate and idealistic, representing the triad of "thesis-
antithesis-synthesis" (27): and Pareto who focused on 
----~ -----~ 
I 
cycles of integration and decay and posed the "mutually 
inconsistent" residues and derivations. Gross regards 
Parsons' dichotomous pattern variables as neo-dialectical, 
while Merton's contrasts of latent and manifest (12), his 
stress on "diversity and interconnection" in theory and 
procedure, complete the account. 53 
Gross loses grasp of his "neo-dialectical frame" during 
his exposition and indeed, he admits there are no real 
guidelines. Nevertheless, his conclusion is momentous: 
the new metatheoretical framework will withstand the inter-
play of alternatives as various as postivism, behaviourism, 
organicism, formalism and functionalism. In fact, he has 
succeeded merely in opening the forum for debate. 
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Pitrim Sorokin's text Sociological Theories of Today (1966)54 
has a whole section devoted to dialectical writing which he 
regards as in renaissance, both in the West and among Soviet 
scholars. Sorokin traces the historical sources of the 
dialectic in Eastern mysticism and in Western theology. 
1uch of his survey is drawn from Gurvitch's Dialectigue 
et sociologie (1962) which he gives generous commentary 
to, followed by briefer accounts of Sartre and the sociology 
of polarities developed by Kuhne (1958).55 
Following Gurvitch Sorokin feels that dialectics is 
not necessarily part of anyone philosophical tradition 
(la). On the other hand, the wide divergence of meanings 
given to the term and the reinterpretations of it by van 
den Berghe (1963) and Dahrendorf (1959) have blurred its 
. 
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distinguishing characteristics beyond repair. 56 For " 
instance, t heir stress on endogenous change as peculiarly 
dialectical is misleading, since this is a common feature 
of theories of historical change. The author's second 
caution is that exponents of dialectics have indiscriminately 
applied the term to many levels or classes of totality and 
their subdivisions. Thirdly, he notes that polar-dualistic 
and triadic typologies of social systems have been extremely 
common in German sociological writing and that such schemes 
do not necessarily involve a dialectic. Conflict, even 
alientation, Sorokin feels, can be studied satisfactorily 
without resort to dialectics. The phase which succeeds an 
alienated state need not necessarily be a swing to its 
oPPosite, but simply a "different phase". Sorokin accuses 
the dialecticians of making vague and general statements 
about totalizations, interpenetrations and equilibriums, 
without any serious study of "basic socio-cultural processes" 
(5a, 29a). They do not aks how and why these social systems 
originate, become organised and adjust to change. His 
fifth criticism identifies the traditional application 
of the term 'dialectics' to both method and object of 
comprehension as a logical confusion . " 
In Sorokin's view there is no distinct dialectical 
logic or method which might replace the laws of formal 
logic, rather he feels the former should be seen as a 
special category of the latter (16a, 17b, 24). Its 
specific function would be directed at: 
----~--.... ----------------------------------------------------~=---~ .. 
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a. making explicit the implicit tensions 
and multi-meaningfulness hidden in many 
concepts of class phenomena, especially 
of socio-cultural class phenomena (7b,30b), 
b. and in clarifying the correlations and 
mutual implications of the meanings of 
many concepts, that otherwise, when 
taken alone, without reference to their 
correlative concepts, are meaningless, 
as the concept of the absolute is 
meaningless without its correlative 
concept of the relative .. . . 57 
36. 
Enlarging on this statement, Sorokin describes the deficiency 
of extreme,unidimensional interpretations of phenomena, the 
behaviourist position might be a case in point. The corrective 
dialectical analysis will reveal the complementary dimensions 
within the matter. 
His summary evaluation is that "the program " has had 
its most successful excursion in the realm of the "infinitely 
multi-dimensional, total, ultimate reality", which encounter 
has shown the impossibility of defining the total reality by 
finite concepts (3c). More mystifying is his addenda that 
"For the same reasons, dialectical logic has been fruitfully 
applied to the analysis of general mUlti-dimensional classes 
of socio-cultural phenomena ... " and such application is 
notably enhanced, if and when used hand in hand with empirical 
methods (8c) .... ,,58 Finally, he charges the dialectician to 
go beyond "mummified" Hegelian-Harxian schemes and study the 
"multiple rhythms of socio-cultural systems". 
The writing of Gross and Sorokin is scholarly in tone, 
but heavy and repetitious in style and woolly in comprehension. 
Further still, it is peculiarly out of touch with contemporary 
developments in both dialectics and hermeneutics. 
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ANALYTIC SUMMARY HERMENEUTIC DIALECTICS 1 
, 
paradigmatic features ~ Sorokin 
la no philos.align x 
b non Marxist philos. x 
c Hegel-early Marx 
d philos.late Marx 
2a unified science 
b soc . method dist. x 
3a objectivist meta. 
b r elativist meta. 
c essentialist meta. x 
4a soc. value free 
b soc. conuni tted 
Sa soc . nomothetic x 
b soc. idiographic 
c both complement 
6a expl.deductive 
b expl.probabilistic 
c expl. functional 
d expl. genetic 
e expl. di alec ti ca 1 
7a wxpl. prediction 
b expl./descr.-undst. x x 
c undst.-action (c.r.) 
8a method empirical 
b method hermeneutic x 
c both complement x 
9 andlyses causal 
10 analyses seek reasons 
11 analyses seek immanent 
12 latent v.manifest m. x 
1 3a determinism subj/obj 
b determinism obj/subj 
c determ.reciprocal 
14a determ.whole/ part 
b determ.part/ whole 
c determ.reciprocal 
lSa analyses diachronic 
b analyses synchronic I~ c both complement 
16a dia.is method x x 
b dia.is reality :-. 
c dia.is meth.& reality 
d dia.is interaction m. r. '., 
17a rejects formal logic x 
b uses formal logic x 
18a dia. simple contrad. 
' b dia.multiple contrad. 
c dia.other factor 
19 physical dia. 
20 production dia . 
21 institutional dia. 
22 intersub j ective dia. 
23 intrasubj ective dia. 
24 cognitive dia. x x 
25 structural (infra) dia. 
26 uses law int.of opp. x 
27 uses law neg.of neg. x 
28 uses law of emergence x 
29a uses systems model x 
b uses conflict model 
c both complement x 
30a applies dia . (exemplar) I' 
b perspective only x x 
.. --.. ~.--.. .......... ----------------------------................................ ~.~ .. ->. 
Comments on the Summaries 
The two hermeneutic dialecticians share four principal 
* characteristics. They use the terms explanation and 
description as interchangeable; they regard heightened 
understanding as the appropriate end of this interpretive 
process or dialectic; and since they see this as a method 
only and not a description of a thing 'in reality' itself, 
it is thus a cognitive phenomenon here, a perspective. 
Gross' recognition of the dialectic as a purely 
hermeneutic exercise or method on the one hand, and his 
acknowledgement of special "dialectical relations" such 
as interaction, adaptation, the "transcendant" and the 
"mutually inconsistent", is somewhat problematic. Again, 
his rejection of formal logic scarcely complies with the 
implicit acceptance of the 'scientific' systems model in 
his work. 
38. 
Sorokin makes similar mistakes combining his comprehension 
of the dialectic as method, with reference to some "infinitely 
multi-dimensional total, ultimate reality", a dialectic of 
reality based on a latent essentialism which again is hard 
to reconcile with the systems approach. 
* A principal or cardinal feature is indicated where there 
is acknowledgement of an item by at least two-thirds of 
the authors in a cluster. 
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Another Hegelian derivative is the critical dialectic 
expounded by the group of German sociologists known as 
the Frankfurt School. Based on an essentialist or negative 
philosophy, the critical world view rej e cts fact and 
actuality in favour of the potentiality that inheres in 
all thought and being. 
Duri~g the Sixties, a debate flared up in European 
circles between this group of dialecticians, led by Adorno, 
and the analytic-empiricists, led by Karl Popper. The 
contention, a product of two incommensurable world views, 
has never been settled. Some of the debate is reflected 
in what follows. 59 
One Dimensional Man (1964) is an application of the critical 
dialectic by an expatriate member of the School, Herbert 
Marcuse.
60 
The study is an exhaustive attack on advanced 
technological societies and their intellectual culture, 
including the philosophy of science. 
Marcuse returns to Hegel and beyond him to those strands 
of classical Greek philosophy in which the world , Being, is 
visualised as antagonistic within itself, afflicted with 
want and negativity (lc, 29b). Classical discourse, he 
observes, reflected this ontological duality in its pre-
occupation with opposites such as Being and non-Being, 
essence and fact, potentiality and actuality. Its logic 
41. 
was responsive to the flux of reality, and meaning too, 
in the Platonic dialectic, was something "gradually 
structured in the process of communication ... never closed" 
(16d 17a, 24).61 But if the laws of thought were the laws 
of reality, this identity, because of the antagonistic 
nature of things, implied also the contradiction of reality 
by thought. Marcuse puts it this way . The objects of 
thought 
are identical in content and meaning 
with, and yet different from the real 
objects of immediate experience. 
'Identical' inasmuch as the concept 
is the result of reflection which has 
understood the thing in the context of 
other things which did not appear in 
the immediate experience, and which 
'explain' the thing (mediation). 62 
What is not immediately given in experience, but inherent 
to the concept is potentiality (3c, 11); " ... terms have 
many meanings because the conditions to which they refer 
have many sides, implications and effects which cannot be 
insulated and stabilized. ,,63 This silent potentiality 
within the concept gives it a transitive meaning - beyond 
mere descriptive reference to the object; the concept 
contains alternatives which may subvert the given state 
(26, 27). Further than this, "the subversive character 
of truth inflicts upon thought an imperative quality ... is 
implies an ought." Theory implies practice (7c). "This 
contradictory two dimensional style of thought is the inner 
form, not only of dialectical logic but of all philosophy 
which comes to grips with reality (18a).,,64 Paradoxically, 
the critical intention of this practical philosophy leads 
-it to idealism, but 
When historical content enters into 
the dialectical concept and determines 
methodologically its development and 
function, dialectical thought attains 
the concreteness which links the 
structure of thought to that of 
reality. Logical truth becomes 
historical truth. The ontological 
tension between essence and appearance, 
between 'is' and 'ought' becomes 
historical tension, and the 'inner 
negativity' of the object - world 
is understood as the work of the 
historical subject - man, in his 
struggle with nature and society 
(13a, 15a). Reason becomes historical 
Reason. 65 
The formal logic of Aristotle, while remaining partly 
committed to the classical metaphysics, abstracted unity 
or identity from the tension of opposites; neutralised 
the material content and sought a universal validity for 
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propositional forms and their connections. The neutralisation 
of the content factor, though expressing an indifference 
towards the object itself, made it amenable to symbolisation 
and discursive treatment. Along with the removal of context, 
the latent "ought" was removed, and attention turned from 
"final" to "first" causes. The move towards symbolisation 
and calculability was a move towards instrumentality and 
manipulation. 66 Philosophy had been born of the search 
for the good life, that is, life in accordance with the 
essence of man. "Scientific thought had to break this 
union of value judgement and analysis, for it became 
increasingly clear that the philosophic values did not 
guide the organisation of society nor the transformation 
of nature. ,,67 
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The formal logical proposition s = p disguises a 
dialectical proposition which states the negative character 
of empirical reality (3c). Dialectical thought thus 
"denies the concreteness of immediate experience", secondly, 
it appears antithetical to science because it contains a 
judgement that condemns the established reality. But, 
this judgement is imposed upon dialectical 
thought by its very faithfulness to the 
object. Dialectical logic cannot be formal 
because it is determined by the real, which 
is concrete ... it is the rationality of 
contradiction, of the opposition of forces, 
tendencies, elements, which constitutes 
the movement of the real, and if comprehended, 
the concept of the real (26).68 
"The stuff of thought is historical stuff no matter 
how abstract, general or pure it may become in philosophic 
or scientific theory.,,69 This experiential stuff is the 
conceptual universal, but its universality is not a formal 
one, it is constituted in the relationships between subject 
and object world. Logical abstraction thus calls for 
sociological abstraction (5a). 
For the factors in the facts are not 
immediate data of observation, measurement 
and interrogation. They become data only 
in an analysis which is capable of 
identifying the structure that holds 
together the parts and processes of society 
and that determines their interrelation 
.... Analysis of the meaning of a term 
or form demands its development in a 
multidimensional universe, where any 
expressed meaning partakes of several 
interrelated, over-lapping and antagonistic 
'systems'. For example, it belongs: 
(a) to an individual project ... 
(b) to an established supra-individual 
system of ideas ... 
(c) to a particular society which itself 
integrates different and even 
conflicting individual and supra-
individual projects. 
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And so to Marcuse's judgement of contemporary society. 
He regards society as a "whole", which exerts power 
over the individual (14a). "It has its empirical hard 
core in the system of institutions, which are established 
and frozen relationships among men.,,70 Society shapes 
itself through an historical project or choice among 
alternatives, which results from the activity of dominant 
interests within it. 21 The techno-societ y is the latent 
expression of such a project - that of the organisation 
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and transformation of the world (25). But "the technological 
a priori is a political a priori, inasmuch as the trans-
formation of nature involves that of man, and inasmuch as 
the 'man made creations' issue from and re-enter the societal 
ensemble.,,71 The project determines too, the whole universe 
of discourse and action, intellectual and material; it 
determines what attitudes and skills are desirable - social 
needs thus become individual needs, and the opposition 
between private and public interest dissolves. With this 
internalisation of the social, individual alienation reaches 
new depths. The totalitarian features of these developments 
reveal the so-called neutrality of technology to be a lie 
(12). The productive apparatus has become in fact, an 
irrational force "destructive of the free development of 
human needs and f acul ties ... '.' 72 
The technological project introduces what larcuse calls 
a closing of the political universe. The chief manifestations 
of this are close cooperation between go ernment and large 
corporations; the fusion of economic planning with military 
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alliances and technical assistance programs; and internally 
the assimilation and neutralisation of sectional interests 
under the impact of domestic media. The sense of societal 
cohesion is enhanced by an ever-present "threat" in the 
foreign relations sphere. "This absorption of ideology 
into reality does not, however, signify 'the end of ideology ' 
... today, the ideology is in the process of production 
itself.,,73 There is an enormous growth o f p arasitical and 
alienated structures which rationalise the intentional wast e 
of this society shaped by advertising, public relations and 
planned obsolescence. Marcuse notes that every aspect of 
the technological culture conforms to its functional 
requirements (14a). Literature reveals a flattening of 
the opposition between everyday social reality and other 
" transcendant" dimensions of experience. The linguistic 
constructions themselves demonstrate the pervasive logic 
of domination : " They have in common a telescoping and 
abridgement of syntax which cuts off development of meaning 
by creating fixed images which impose themselves with an 
overwhelming and petrified concreteness . ,,74 This expression 
through images works against conceptualisation and hen c e 
against thinking itself. Language use becomes anti-critical 
and un-dialectical, for as Marcuse reminds us it is the 
concept which "denies the identification of the thing with 
its function; and distinguishes that which the thing is 
from the contingent functions of the thing in established 
reality.,,75 Philosophy too works in the service of the 
instrumental mentality. Its function, as that of psychology 
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and sociology, is a therapeutic one, concerned with the 
exposure of absurdities, illusions, and oddities, but at 
the same time, it is entirely non-theoretical : description " 
alone is considered feasible, and should take the place of 
1 . 76 exp anat10n. 
The corresponding developments in the philosophy of 
science have the same paradoxical outcomes. The physicist's 
"matter" appears to fade into mathematical an d topographical 
"relations". He uses a vocabulary of events, projections, 
possibilities. But these are "meaningfully objective only 
for a subject - not only in terms of observability and 
measurability, but in terms of the very structure of the 
event of relationships. In other words, the subject here 
. 1 d · t . t t· ,,77 1nvo ve 1S a cons 1 u 1ng one .... fethodologically, 
this trend leads to a suspension of inquiry into the "nature 
of reality" and an emphasis on the specific operations 
required to deal with it - a functional approach. Marcuse's 
summation nevertheless is that the scientific method is so 
far the only method to claim practical success (8c). Its 
unfort~nate aspect, he feels, is that the dominati o n of 
nature it has promoted has led to the domination of man. 
What is called for, he urges, is a "redefinition of values 
in technical terms as elements in the technological process 
(4b )." . 78 I'" 
Sociological research under the domination of the 
operationalist mentality, has likewise entered into the 
uncritical and therefore ideological "empiricism" of the 
sciences. Its analysis of social conditions is deceptively 
concrete because it treats facts removed from their 
theoretical context (2b).79 This approach would be 
harmless if the given social form were the ultimate 
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frame of reference for theory and practice - but obviously, 
in the light of Marcuse's critique of society, it is not. 
~Iarcuse reflects on the classical and influential study 
in labour relations made at the Hawthorn Works of the 
Western Electric Company (30a). The origina l researchers, 
he finds, considered that workers' complaints such as 
"the washrooms are unsanitary" or "rates are too low", 
were vague and seemed to lack "objective reference" to 
"standards" generally accepted. The researchers thus 
proceeded to reformulate or "operationalise" these state-
ments in order to designate accurately the particular 
situations from which they had arisen, and the particular 
actions that would be needed to change these conditions. 
The universal concept of 'wages' would thus be reduced 
to "B's present earnings" ... 
the personal discontent is (thus) isolated 
from the general unhappiness ... the worker 
B, once his medical bills have been taken 
care of, will recognise that , generally 
speaking, wages are not too low, and that 
they were a hardship-only in his individual 
situation. His case has been subsumed under 
another genus - that of personal hardship 
cases . [By contrast] the untranslated 
statement, established a concrete relation 
between the particular case and the whole 
of which it is a case - and this whole 
includes the conditions outside the 
respective job ... ~O 
This elimination of the universal and hence transitive 
concept has meant only one thing - suppression of the Reason 
which is history (6c). 
'. 
~~~------------------------------~~  
Certainly the most obscure addition to critical dialectics 
has come from Theodor Adorno. His Negative Dialectics,81 
published in 1966, would leave behind the notion of a 
dialectic which produces something positive by means of 
negation , supplanting a further negative for it - and this 
is the key to the title of his book (27). This vast work 
embraces a critique of Heidegger's ontology, Kant's 
conception of freedom, and Hegel's logic and philosophy 
of history. The models of "negative dialectics" Adorno 
promises at the beginning of the book are really remedial 
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essays in these areas expressing their author's determination 
to emancipate dialectics from the philosophy of Hegel. His 
dialectic aligns itself with Marx's historical materialism, 
denying both the positive Marxists' primacy of matter and 
the existentialists' primacy of the subject (lc, 15a). 
Dialectics, Adorno writes, begins with the fact that 
an object is never totally accounted for by its concept _ 
subject and object, for example, "constitute one another 
as concepts as much as by virtue of such constitution they 
82 depart from each other" (13c, 16d, 24). The first premise 
here is the untruth of identity (17a). Yet, to think, is 
to identify. Aristotleian logic and its law of the excluded 
middle are based on this assumption and whatever is 
inconsistent wi th it is termed contradict ion. Dialect ics, 
f 'd'" 83 on the other hand, is "the consistent use 0 non-1 ent1ty , 
and this is where Adorno parts company with Hegel, for the 
latter, he feels, was still under the sway of "the identity 
philosophy": 
I 
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In Hegel there was a coincidence of 
identity and positivity; the inclusion 
of all non-identical and objective 
things in a subjectivity expanded and 
exalted into an absolute spirit was 
to effect the reconcilement ... it is 
precisely the insatiable identity 
principle that perpetrates antagonism 
by suppressing contradiction (18a).84 
For Hegel, the negation of the negation produced a positive _ 
a schema borrowed from the logic of the formal mathematics 
that he was supposed to have rejected. Bu t this leads 
straight back to consequential thinking, argues Adorno. 
Further than this, it gives weight to "the methodology of 
science", which uncritically, comes to be called philosophy 
(26) . 
Paradoxically, Adorno describes negative dialectics 
as more positive in its allegiance to the object than 
positivism: 
Dialectically ... cognition seeks to say 
what something is, while identitarian 
thinking says what something comes under, 
what it exemplifies or represents, and 
what, accordingly, it is not itself. 
The more relentlessly our identitarian 
thinking besets its object, the further 
will it take us from the identity of 
the object (36, 8b, 11).85 
In this book, dialectics is anti-system, it is not 
even a standpoint. Rather it entails an attitude of 
philosophic self-reflection (30b). Its rationale is this: 
the revolution failed, now it is time to "understand" (7b). 
A lesser known sociologist, James Hansen, joined the critique 
of empiricism with his article in Catalyst, 1967. 86 Empiricists 
such as Nagel and Hook tell us to submit our findings to the 
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experimental procedures of science for "verification"; 
psychologists insist on use of the "laboratory" or 
"computer"; sociologists collect "data"; philosophers 
urge that even ethical claims should be supported 
"scientifically". Only after such verification are 
claims considered meaningful, yet Hansen points out, what 
these vaguely delineated slogans really mean, is a question 
that is never asked. 
Hansen expands: the empiricist outlook is based on 
a view of the world of "facts" as "objectively given". 
Objectivity or meaning is thought of as inherent to the 
object itself, rather than, as the phenomenologists would 
say , "intersubjectively constituted" (3b). This is not to 
deny the existence of a "referendum external to consciousness" 
of course the dialectician is not to be confused with the 
idealist. But what the dialectician sees before him is 
the empiricist unwittingly trapped in a "fetishism of facts 
and objects ... created to serve his own interests" in the 
first place. As Engels put it " . .. it is precisely the 
alteration of nature by men ... which is the most essential 
and immediate basis of human thought ... ,.' 87 Su c h inquiry 
is inevitably value laden, linked as it is to specifically 
generated human needs (4b). 
The notion of 'fact' is thus, for the dialectician, 
relative to some historically evolved theory or way of 
seeing. And the empiricists' emphasis on "correct 
procedure" stands in sharp contrast to the dialecticians' 
theoretical and methodological pluralism . It l e ads to a 
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view of science as static, resembling Kuhn's "normal 
scientific activity", as opposed to an open ended variety 
of research. This is not to say that dialectics is 
synonymous with cognitive anarchy. The dialectician 
is " ... bound by certain natural or ontological conditions", 
though these may change. What he tries to avoid is 
"setting up particular criteria as the criteria". 
It is a condition of closed empirical research that 
facts be "consistent" with theories, yet as Feyerabend 
remarks, what this implies is that a new theory may be 
eliminated 
... not because it is in disagreement 
with the facts, but because it is in 
disagreement with another theory, a 
theory moreover, whose confirming 
instances it shares. It thereby makes 
the as yet untested part of that theory 
a measure of validity ... [and] contributes 
to the preservation of the old and 
familiar. 88 
Hansen observes that even piecemeal knowledge, "the result 
of a lot of running around by fact-collectors" is grounded 
in theoretical presupposition and there is no getting away 
from it. 
The cumulative character of empirical knowledge leads 
it into yet further reification - the view of a hierarchical 
relationship between the sciences (2b). Nagel writes, 
"The objective of the reduction is to show that the laws 
or general principles of the secondary science are simply 
logical consequences of the assumptions of the primary 
sciences.,,89 By contrast, the dialectician pulls away 
from the structure of actuality and explores potentiality 
(3c) - Feyerabend describes the implications of this: 
Dialectical philosophers have always 
emphasised the need not to think in a 
"mechanical" way, that is, in a frame-
work whose concepts are precisely 
defined and kept stable in any argument, 
and they have pointed out that arguments 
precipitating progress usually terminate 
in concepts that are very different 
indeed from the concepts in which the 
question was originally formulated (17a). 
They have also paid due attention to the 
fact that the development of our knowledge 
presupposes the development of at least 
two alternative systems of thought, of 
a thesis and of an anti-thesis (26).90 
Hansen summarises his perspective (30b): in place of 
a fetishistic enslavement of man by the sciences he has 
created, dialectical or negative thinking pre-supposes 
investigation into the nature of concepts themselves (24), 
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and thus offers an escape from the contemporary subjugation 
to the "given". 
Jurgen Habermas is the third member of the Frankfurt School 
to provide a normative dialectical framework for social 
science (30b). Habermas' work is yet another argument with 
the prevailing positivist theory of knowledge but this one 
is based on an anthropological reconstruction of the 
dialectic of theory and practice. This contribution to 
the "critical theory" developed in his Erkenntnis und 
Interesse (1968),91 rests on a phenomenological modification 
of the Marxist notion of material synthesis or human 
development through labour and is achieved by the 
.. 92 
reinstatement of reflection as a self-realizing actlvlty. 
Habermas' normative anthropology is summarised in 
five theses: 
The achievements of the transcendental 
subject (13a) have their basis in the 
natural history of the human species. 
Knowledge equally serves as an instrument 
and transcends mere self-preservation. 
Knowledge constitutive interests take 
form in the medium of work, language 
and power. 
In the power of self-reflection, knowledge 
and interest are one. 
The unity of knowledge and interes t 
proves itself in a dialectic that takes 
the historical traces of suppressed 
dialogue and reconstructs what has been 
repressed (16d). 93 
The knowledge constitutive interests (4b) named in the 
theses are seen by Habermas as basic "moments" in the 
dialectic of social evolution (14a, 15a). They are of 
three kinds - technical, practical and emancipatory, 
corresponding to the three media-work (20), language 
and power (21, 24).94 Leaving aside the emancipatory 
interest (23) for the moment, it becomes apparent that 
what Habermas has done is to replace Marx's notions of 
forces and relations of production with his own notions 
of instrumental and normative activity - labour and social 
interaction. This move returns to the Hegelian emphasis 
on the dialectics of moral life and brings his thinking 
into line with the Weber-Parsons sociological emphasis on 
systems of action (lc, 29a). 
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Instrumental action is purposive rational action guided 
by empirical knowledge and technical rules. Social action 
is expressive action guided by intersubjectively shared 
meanings and rules, including roles. The latter rules are 
, 
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not reducible to the technical rules, and so a dual 
epistemology replaces the Marxist reductionist model of 
substructure determining superstructure. In turn, the 
overthrow of the substructure is not sufficient to liberate 
men from the constraints on them; for these arise from 
conventional distortions and blockages in language and 
culture. 
While instrumental action correspo nds 
to the constraint of external nature 
and the level of the forces of production 
determines the extent of technical 
control over natural forces, communicative 
action stands in correspondence to the 
suppression of man's own nature. 95 
Only a reflective comprehension of these historically 
evolved behavioural and conceptual schemes can release 
the individual from their influe nce. This critical activity 
constitutes the emancipatory cognitive interest. 
Habermas develops his critical sociology around 
Horkheimer's distinction between critical and traditional 
96 theory. The traditional notion of pure theory which 
should inform action is misconceived. Both the natural 
and social sciences have tried to operate with such an 
assumption - a theory which comprehends reality as structured 
97 
and independent of the life processes of the knower. 
This objectivist attitude is called positivism in the 
natural sCiences, historicism in social science, and 
phenomenology is only another variant of it. The 
renunciation of the practical life aspect in scientific 
thinking is indicated by the term value-freedom, but at 
the same time, 
LJl~ __________________ ~-~ 
.. . it presupposes the transcendental 
framework that is the precondition of 
the meaning of the validity of such 
propositions. As soon as these state-
ments are understood in relation to the 
prior frame of reference to which they 
are affixed, the objectivist illusion 
dissolves and makes visible a knowledge 
constitutive interest (26).98 
The empirico-analytic sciences incorporate an instrumental 
interest, that of technological rationality. But science 
and technology have become self legitimating authorities 
owing to the uncritical epistemology of positivism , and 
so this fact is disguised. The historical hermeneutic 
sciences incorporate a practical cognitive interest, which 
is the basis of understanding in both everyday life and in 
the scientific community. Hence the dual model, described 
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above, simply reverses the order of reduction by replacing 
the materialist dynamic with a normative one. 
Explanation in the empirico-analytic sciences is 
deductive; in the historical hermeneutic sciences it tends 
to be narrative. As for sociology, Habermas distinguishes 
two types of explanatory activity : the systematic sciences 
of social action which proceed as does nomological science 
(2a) , and on the other hand, the critical sociology which 
should reach " ... beyond this goal, to determine when the ... 
invariant regularities of social action ... express ideologi c ally 
frozen relationships of dependence that can in principle be 
transformed ... ~ 99 The two sociologies will mediate each 
other achieving a balance between objectivity of fact (2a , 
3a) and critical orientation (2b, 4b). 
Habermas describes ideology as the compelled 
suspension of doubt. Institutions are repressive orders 
LJL~ ______________________ ~~~~ 
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which become split off from their motivational foundation 
(25) structures of distorted communication and exist with 
unquestioned legitimacy. The focus of the critical 
sociology is to bring about the emancipation of self-
conscious agents by encouraging reflection on their 
formative life processes (7c). As in the five theses, 
this unity of knowledge and interest will become a dialectic 
that reconstructs what has been repressed - t hat is , the 
distorted behaviours and language games imposed by 
socialization. 
The critical sociology will use both causal explanatio n 
and understanding of meanings in a dialectical way (9, 10), 
working after the psychoanalytic model: "What is called 
rationalization at this level is called ideology at the 
level of collective action. In both cases the manifest 
content of statements is falsified by consciousness 
unreflected tied to interests (13) ... ~100 The explained 
empirical structures are also intentional structures , so 
that self reflection can reach and dissolve up the 
unconsciously caused behaviours - releasing the subject 
from "hypostasised powers". The depth hermeneutic (8b) 
demonstra tes i ts explanatory power once the obj ect of 
understanding is shown to have been overcome. Dialecti cal 
explanation is validated by this translation o f theory to 
practice (5e, 7c). 
Despite himself, Habermas' contribution to the critical 
theory is highly systematized almost mechanical at times. 
A curious contrast to the sylph-like dialectic of Adorno's 
book. 
r,,~ 
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The methodological complacency of Australian academic 
sociology remained intact until the 1972 meeting of the 
profession. But the event was heralded quietly a year 
earlier by the appearance in a small Marxist publication, 
Arena, of a paper called 'Positivism and Dialectics' .101 
Its author, Heinz SchUtte, is a German fluently acquainted 
with the European debate. He identifi e s with "Critical 
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Theory" and its preoccupation with the rel ati onship between 
theory and practice. 
The aim of the sociologist he argues, is to produce 
an hermeneutic of the ongoing socio-historical situation 
in order to further individual self-determination (7c , lb, 
15a). The objectivist or positivist approach would extend 
the logic of the natural sciences into sociology , deducing 
social facts from nomological hypotheses, producing 
experimentally falsifiable theories of an explanatory and 
prognostic character. A method, of course , which involves 
strict separation of the logic and the psychology of 
researCh, separation of factual statements and value 
judgments, a "Methodological Dualism" in Gouldner's sense. 
SchUtte considers that to work deductively like this is to 
exclude the possible encounter with alternatives (2b). 
Positivism in research supports the status quo by 
assuming a reality that is positively "given". In examining 
interaction patterns in a company , for example , the question 
becomes: "How do individuals communicate in a hierarchically 
stratified system?" The implications of this definition 
of the problem, SchUtte points out, are that "the company" 
UL~-__________________ ~~ 
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itself is accepted as an irreversible fact. The hierarchy 
is not questioned, and what is sought is the most efficient 
communication pattern which in application will minimise 
conflicts and maximise profits - the in-built goal of the 
system (12). 
The dialectician faced with a similar problem will not 
differ from the positivist in the use of empirical techniques 
and quantification where appropriate (8c), but his definition 
of the research situation will lead him to ask: "what are 
the roots of social conditions where men are found in 
positions of authority over other men? How are sociological 
findings first, influenced by, and second, used by, outside 
interests? How should the social context be changed so that 
the findings of such research are accessible to everybody?" 
Implicit to all this is the sociologist's awareness of his 
active involvement in the socio-historical situation (4b, 
30b) . 
The positivists, even those directed by "piecemeal 
social engineering", intend that reality should become 
" ... technologically controllable; the theory produces the 
conditions for its explanation, its prognosis and its 
planning. Its interest lies in a global growth of formal 
d t . It' l't ,,102 an rna erla ra lona 1 y .... Dialecticians 
.. . aim at social emancipation. For 
them, social science is under the 
obligation to foster the individual's 
liberation from the organised structures 
of reality .... Science and technology, 
potential media of emancipation, more 
and more become means of repression of 
the real needs of men .... Popper's premise, 
'the open-society' simply is not th r .103 
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It is as if positivism and dialectics face social 
reality from opposite sides of the objectivation-alienation 
cycle; the social emancipists would dissolve the alienating-
objective-conditions by understanding them, thus giving 
social reality back to the men who create it C13c, 16d); 
the social technologists would adapt man to the objective-
conditions, so producing "a society which has come to an 
end within itself and permanently reproduces itself.,,104 
......... r '---=-.~~ I'~ 60. 
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ANALYTIC SUMt-'.ARY 
2aradiSl!,!!atic features Marcuse/Adorno/Hansen/Habermas/Schutte 
la no philos.align. 
b non Marxist philos. x 
c Hegel-early Marx x x x 
d philos.late Marx 
2a unified science x 
b soc. method distn . x x x x x 
3a objectivist meta. x 
b relativist meta . x 
c essentialist meta . x x x 
4a soc . value free 
b soc. committed x x x x 
Sa soc . nomothetic x 
b soc. idiographic 
c both complement 
6a expl. deducti ve 
b expl.probabilistic 
c expl. functional 
I 
d expl. genetic 
e expl.dialectical x x 
7a expl. prediction 
b expl./descr.-undst. x 
c undst.-action (c.r . ) x x x 
Ba method empirical 
b method hermeneutic x x x 
c both complement x x 
9 analyses causal x 
10 analyses seek reasons x 
11 analyses seek immanent x x 
12 latent v.manifest m. x x x 
13a determinism subj/obj x x 
b determinism obj/subj 
c determ.reciprocal x x 
14a determinism whole/ part x x 
b determinism part/whole 
c determ.reciprocal 
lsa analyses diachronic x x x x 
b analyses synchronic 
c both complement 
16a dia. is method 
b dia . is reality 
c dia.is meth.& reality 
d dia.is interaction mr x x x x 
17a rejects formal logic x x x 
b uses formal logic 
IBa dia.simple contrad. x x 
b dia.multiple contrad. 
c dia.other factor 
19 physical dia. 
20 production dia. x 
21 institutional dia. x x 
22 intersubjective dia. 
23 intrasubjective dia. x 
24 cognitive dia. x x x x 
25 structural (infra) dia. x x 
26 uses law int.of opp. x 
27 uses law neg.of neg. x x 
2B uses law of emergence 
29a uses systems model x 
b uses conflict model x 
c both complement 
30a applies dia. (exemplar) x 
b perspective only x x x x 
LJL~ ______________________ ~~~ 
Comments on the Summaries 
The critical dialecticians reveal six major features _ 
they stress the methodological distinctiveness of sociology; 
its committed stance; regard analysis as concerned with 
the ongoing historical process; the dialectic as expressing 
the intereaction of this process with comprehension of it; 
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and they see the dialectic as primarily a c ognitive 
phenomenon; a perspective on sociology, which is not applied. 
Marcuse is committed to an essentialist epistemology 
but like Friedrichs he also gives credit to the empirical 
methods of the exact sciences. This is not easy to explain. 
The transcendental historical subjectivity found in 
Marcuse and Habermas has an interesting status, it is a 
subjective, yet objective determinant of individual action. 
It appears on the matrix as subj/obj and whole/part. The 
transcendental subject is an underlying factor or infra-
structure, hence there is a structuralist component in the 
thought of both Marcuse and the 'objectivist' Habermas. 
This same preoccupation with the immanent is found in Adorno's 
writing and it is a peculiarly un-humanistic feature of the 
Frankfurt approach. 
Habermas with his two levels of sociological explanation 
seems to vacillate like Weber before him, between a commitment 
to scientific explanation and verstehen. His acknowledged 
interaction of m thod and social reality strains his 
objectivist epistemology and systems inclination. 
Hansen's position reveals a confusion between a 
phenomenological version of reality as intersubjectively 
constituted, that is a brand of relativism, and an 
epistemological essentialism. 
SchUtte's article is one expression of Frankfurt 
theorising which avoids any methodological pitfalls. 
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REFLEXIVE DIALECTICS 
SARTRE 
BERGER AND LUCKMANN 
YOUNG 
GOULDNER 
FRIEDRICHS 
64. 
The reflexive dialectic descends directly from the philosophy 
of Hegel and is founded on the assumption of reciprocal 
determination of subjective and objective, individual and 
social domains. Its major implication for sociology is an 
emphasis on the sociologists' inevitable invo lvement in the 
on-going social process and on the impossibility of his 
assuming a value-free stance in his research. 
An early contribution to the philosopby and method of 
reflexive dialectics was Jean-Paul Sartre's Critique de 
la raison dialectique (1960). The book has had wide 
currency, possibly owing to its fortuitous launching into 
a community alert for alternatives. The introduction to 
the work, translated and published separately as The problem 
of method 105 is particularly well known. The approach here 
is not systematic, nor is it free of polemic, but there is 
no pretence to dialectical laws - such regularities are 
anathema in the existentialist variant of Marxism. 
Dialectical materialism had become, through Engel's 
agency, a total philosophy of nature. His Anti-DUhring 
(1867) and Dialectics of Nature (1882)106 presented a 
distinctly positivist dialectic which was intended to 
convince members of the Second International of the 
scientific authenticity of the revolutionary theory. 
It was essential that the working class appreciate not 
only the "inexorable laws" of economics, but the "natural 
inevitability" of their own role in social change. Sartre 
breaks with the "vulgar Marxist" dialectic of nature and 
draws a methodological distinction between the natural and 
human levels of discourse (2b). As a phenomenologist, he 
has little interest in the status of the material world. 
Whether one wishes to postulate dialectical connections 
operative in the natural world, or not, is a matter of 
personal conviction only, as far as he is concerned. In 
any case, the existence of such relations will have no 
bearing on the uniquely human capacity for 'freedom'. 
was, 
The ontology of the original existential dialectic 
107 like Hegel's which Sartre is heavily indebted to, 
an historical one; but no longer based on a sense of 
history as some immanent rational force. In the original 
version, history expressed the contingency of existence, 
leaving the present distinguished by its seeming dis-
connectedness with the past; a world of brute fact and 
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absurdity. Only what did not 'exist' had reason or meaning, 
and the contingent was not, as the materialist would have it, 
necessity in disguise (3c). Thus the past did not determine 
human action, rather, this action found its determinations 
in the future, in choice of a project. History, the collective 
outcome of individual praxis is called "totalisation" and 
its direction is unpredictable (5b). 
The revised position of Sartre in relation to Hegel and 
Marx which is expressed in the Critique, r turns to the notion 
of immanent historical reason as somehow guiding at least the 
less alienated individual choice (lc, 14a). Sartre's 
comment is almost autobiographical "History is less opaque 
than it was. The proletariat has discovered and released 
its secret (11, 25).,,108 The idea that man makes history, 
but other than he believes himself to be making it, while 
it, in turn, makes him, other than he believes himself to 
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be (12, 14c, 15a) now takes on new dimensions, but the basic 
instrumentality of alientation which is central to the 
historical process remains "The realisation o f the possible 
necessarily results in the production of an object or an 
event in the social world. This realisation is then an 
objectification, and the original contradictions which are 
reflected there testify to our alientation.,,109 
What is the appropriate method of comprehending this 
dialectical process in all its mediations (7b, 16d)? Sartre 
puts forward what he calls the regressive-progressive method, 
which he considers takes into account "at the same time the 
circularity of the material conditions and the mutual 
conditioning of the human relations established on that 
basis (13c).,,110 He enlarges: 
We should define the method of the 
existentialist approach as a regressive-
progressive and analytic-synthetic method. 
It is at the same time an enriching cross-
reference between the object (which 
contains the object in its totalisation). 
In fact, when the object is rediscovered 
in its profundity and in its particularity, 
then instead of remaining external to the 
totalisation (as it was up until the time 
when the Marxists undertook to integrate 
it into history) it enters immediately 
into contradiction with it (18a). In 
short, the simple, inert, juxtaposition 
of the epoch and the object gives away 
abruptly to a living conflict.111 
This is nowhere a lucid text. What Sartre appears to be 
about is a form of contextual analysis (Sb) with special 
attention to the behaviour of successive contradictions 
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and synthetic totalisations. For example: a study of the 
past, the growth of the individual, his milieu, his project, 
and reconstruction of the "reciprocity" of relationships 
between those. 
Sartre rejects organicist Marxian sociologies which 
universalise and totalise the social object (5b).112 Like 
Marx himself, he insists that this totality is nothing more 
than a multiplicity of relations among men (22). It is at 
the most - "a de-totalised totality". Within it, the 
individual praxis cuts across the field of instrumental 
possibilities. In relation to the latter, which is given, 
the action is negative; in relation to its intention it is 
positive. Paradoxically this same positivity opens out into 
the non-existent and future. What characterises man above 
all, is this capacity to go beyond the situation (2S). The 
original urgency for this transcendence is found in simple 
material "need". 
Identification of the origins of consciousness with a 
negative state, need, introduces the subject as being-for-
itself, as nothing and as ultimate freedom. The subject 
stands opposed to the culturally given, matter, being-in-
itself, objectivity. The man who, conditioned by the given, 
acts out a role and confus s this empirical self with his 
own consciousness, submits in bad faith to an alienated 
existence (12). He becomes a determinate being-for-others 
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(22), playing into the hands of the scientistic - those 
who would "deny the specificity of structures" and "reduce 
change to identity" (17a). 
The dialectical method, on the contrary , 
refuses to reduce, it follows the 
reverse procedure. It surpasses by 
conserving, but the terms of the 
surpassed contradiction cannot account 
for either the transcending itself or 
the subsequent synthesis: on the 
contrary, it is the synthesis which 
clarifies them (26, 27, 28) ... it i s 
the choice which must be interrogated, 
if one wants to explain (10) ... ~3 
The focus on the negative is a significant dialectical 
feature of Sartre's writing, though it is not particularly 
prominent in the essay under discussion. 114 His theory of 
knowledge rests on the assumption of consciousness as 
Nothing; if consciousness were itself being-in-itself, it 
could not at the same time be that which intends being-in-
itself in the act of knowing. Secondly, the intellectual 
differentiation of one object from another calls for a 
constant process of sifting, comparing and re-defining of 
each object as 'this' and not 'that'. Cognition is a constant 
process of nihilation and transcendence (24). 
Dialectics for Sartre, as for his predecessors, refers 
to both connections between events and to the method of 
knowing these. The dialectical reason reaches towards 
truth, and truth is conceived as a dynamic relationship 
involving being and knowing, object and thought (4b, 16d). 
In an extended footnote to The problem of method, Sartre 
acknowledges the discovery of microphysics - that the 
experimenter is part of the experimental system - as the 
first principle of knowing. However, he does not examine 
L..I. . 
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how this applies to use of the regressive-progressive method 
itself; he merely reiterates his point that "the revelation 
of a situation is affected in and through the praxis which 
changes it (7c, 30b).,,115 
The dialectic of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann links the 
synthesis of sociological perspectives that constitutes 
their theoretical contribution The Social Construction of 
Reality (1966).116 The treatise involves a redirection of 
the sociology of knowledge away from its traditional pre-
occupation with the history of ideas, towards a new under-
standing of the every day, taken for granted, common-sense 
stock of knowledge (30b). In its articulation of this comrnon-
sense reality, Berger and Luckmann's project reaches in scope 
from the Durkheimian sociology of externally 'real, factitious 
and objective structures to the Weberian interest in the 
subjectively meaningful. The two sociologies are mediated 
by the social theory of SchUtz and by Mead's symbolic 
interactionism. 117 In this way, the authors forge a bridge 
between the objective-social and subjective-individual 
spheres and between sociology and psychology as disciplines. 
The dialectical sociology of Berger and Luckmann locates 
itself among the humanistic disciplines and it draws its 
foundations from both phenomenological and historicist 
thought (2b). However, the approach is not necessarily 
anti-empirical; 'reality', for example, is defined as 
"a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognise 
as having a being independent to our own volition" (3a), 
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while "knowledge" exists as "the certainty that phenomena 
are 'real' and that they possess specific characteristics. ,,118 
Nor does this sociology exclude the possibility of a value-
free science of men (46), and in this, it departs somewhat 
from the logic of its historicism and the relativist 
tendencies of the sociology of knowledge. It is thus not 
surprising to find that the basic dialectic here, emerges from 
a species of absolute - the biological realm. The processes 
to be explored originate in a dialectic between nature and 
society, "between the individual's biological substratum and 
his socially produced identity.,,119 The organism limits 
what is socially possible, resists to some extent the moulding 
process of socialisation, but modification does occur and 
biological frustrations are inevitable. This social 'reality' 
which imposes on biological man (20, 21) is not, however, 
an independent concrete reality in itself, but the cumulative 
product of his own habit patterns (9). "Institutionalisation 
occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of 
habitualized actions by types of actors .... Institutions 
further imply historicity and control" (9).120 The dialectical 
paradox is thus: "Society is a human product. Society is 
an objective reality. Man is a social product" (13c, 16d).121 
The authors are careful to point out that their dialectic 
should in no way be confused with Engel's dialectics of 
nature. The latter "projects specifically human phenomena 
into non-human nature and then proceeds to theoretically 
dehumanise man by looking upon him as but the object of 
natural forces or laws of nature.,,122 The departure here, 
is rather from the Hegelian-Marxian-Sartrian notion of 
objectivation (lc): 
The process by which the externalized 
products of human activity attain the 
character of objectivity is objectivation 
(20). The institutional world is 
objectivated human activity ... man, 
(not, of course in isolation but in 
his collectivities) and his social 
world interact with each other. The 
product acts back upon the producer. 
Externalization and objectivation are 
moments in a continuing dialectical 
process. The third moment in this 
process ... is internalization (by which 
the objectivated social world is 
retrojected into consciousness (24) 
in the course of socialization) .... 
The expanding institutional order 
develops a corresponding canopy of 
legitimations (12), stretching over 
it a protective cover of both cognitive 
and normative interpretation. These 
legitimations are learned by the new 
generation during the same process that 
socialises them into the institutional 
order (29a).123 
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It is in this way then, that subjective intent becomes 
objective facticity. Accepted activity patterns,objectivated 
by participation in a common sign system or language, become 
sedimented over time. Furthermore, this body of traditional 
knowledge or "universe" is maintained and rationalised by 
elaboration of the conceptual apparatus of which it partakes. 
Mythology and religion are examples of legitimating ideas. 
Occasionally it happens by reverse; and institutions are 
changed in response to a theory. Either way a dialectic of 
knowledge is at work (24) and definitions of reality tend 
to be self-fulfilling in character (16d).124 
"By virtue of this accumulation, a social stock of 
knowledge is constituted, which is transmitted from generation 
to generation and which is available to the indi idual in 
everyday life." The dialectic operating at the objective, 
collective or social level is thus grounded in the 
psychological. Here, externalisation, objectivation and 
internalisation are no longer simultaneous phases in an 
historical complex, but actual sequences in the individual 
biography (15a, 23) . Internalisation is the first and 
fundamental process, and the self-identity which is its 
outcome is crucial to the orientation of the self in a 
meaningful social reality. 
I live in the common-sense world of 
everyday life equipped with specific 
bodies of knowledge. What is more, 
I know that others share at least 
part of this knowledge, and they 
know that I know this. My inter-
action with others in everyday life 
is, therefore, constantly affected 
by our participation in the available 
stock of common knowledge (22) . 125 
And so the objective facticity enters the subjective. The 
child undergoing the primary socialisation assimilates the 
definitions of reality which the significant others in his 
life-world seem to hold. Berger and Luckmann write: 
It entails a dialectic between 
identification by others and self-
identification; between objectively 
assigned and subjectively appropriated 
identity. The dialectic which is 
present each moment the individual 
identifies with his significant others 
is, as it were, the particularisation 
in individual life of the general 
dialectic of society.126 
It is noteworthy that Berger and Luckmann in their 
attempt to unify the social and psychological by means of 
a dialectical model reject the contribution of Freud, 
himself a great dialectical psychologist. Their comments 
here reflect also on their stance vis-a-vis the Frankfurt 
-~ 
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theorists' blend of psycho-analytic and Marxian insights, 
for they insist that "Freudian psychology ... is fundamentally 
incompatible with the anthropological presuppositions of 
Marxism ... ,.,127 The dichotomy falls between "the conception 
of man as a self producing being [Marx] and a conception of 
'human nature' [Freud]. ,,128 The poli tical implications of 
the two views are enormously at variance . 
There would seem to be something idios ync ratic in the 
eclectic Berger and Luckmann's rejection of Freud, especially 
since they recognise his own vacillation between a theory of 
human nature and his assertions about the plasticity of the 
libido. Certainly the conflicting philosophical orientations 
of Weber and Durkheim did not stand in the way of their 
theoretical integration by the authors. They admit towards 
the end of their book that " ... in the fully socialized 
individual there is a continuing internal dialectic between 
. . d' b' I . I b ,124 Th . t ' ldentlty an ltS 10 oglca su -stratum. ' e reJec lon 
of the Freudian schema and its postulated 'unconscious' is 
a rejection of the conceptual machinery which would serve 
to enlarge this intrasubjective dialectic of theirs. 
Berger and Luckmann's notion of legitimation - the dialectic 
of rationalization is taken up by L-C. Young and applied 
(30a) to an analysis of rural stratification in Republican 
China (21, 24).130 Young's paper, which is published in the 
1970 issue of Social Research, develops from Weber's argument 
for an oscillation between status-stratification and class-
stratification accompanying technological and economic chang 
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The late 1930's saw the gradual disintegration of status-
stratification and of social integration as the country 
was vitiated by world depression, famine, internal banditry 
and heavy land taxes on the peasants. At the same time a 
body of radical scholars espousing a class-conflict theory 
emerged. Young writes, " ... we must conclude that there 
existed a high degree of symmetry between the conflict ... 
and the objective reality (3a) of stratifi cation. ,,131 
For, according to Berger and Luckmann 
... the rise and fall of definitions of 
reality does not take place in isolation 
from the blood and sweat of general 
history (15a, 16d) .... Social change 
must always be understood as standing 
in a dialectical relationship to the 
history of ideas. [Furthermore] 
definitions of reality have self 
fulfilling potency ... +32 
As the status system declined the class-conflict system 
consolidated, confirming the image of the scholars. Young 
concludes that theoretical legitimation is not only a 
reflection, but also a modifier, of social reality. 
While Friedrichs was mapping his course for a dialectical 
paradigm in sociology, Alvin Gouldner came forward with his 
radically outspoken plan for a reflexive attitude in the 
discipline. 133 His Coming Crisis of Western Sociology 
(1970) which describes the rise and decline of functionalism 
and the growth of a new ideological polycentrism, also 
outlines the historical mission of his perspective, the 
"Reflexive Sociology" (30b). 
It would require that knowledge of the 
world cannot be advanced apart from 
the sociologist's knowledge of himself 
and his position in the social world 
or apart from his efforts to change 
these (2a, 4b) ... it seeks to transform 
(15a) as well as to know the alien 
world outside the sociologist as well 
as the alien world inside of him (7c, 
16d) ... it would accept the fact that 
the roots of sociology pass through 
the sociologist as a total man, and 
that the question he must confront 
therefore, is not merely how to work 
but how to live. 134 
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This attitude introduced a new historical sensitivity, 
and the end of the "Methodological Dualism", which Gouldner 
writes, has dominated social science so far. The sociologist 
will now treat his own beliefs as he is accustomed to treating 
the beliefs of others, by questioning them - this bringing 
him closer to those he studies. The new approach will be 
based on something akin to the method of Verstehen (8b). 
It will not be characterised by "what" it studies so much 
as by the mutually constitutive relationship established 
between the enquiring subject and the studied object (3b, 
13a , 22). Awareness of self on the part of the sociologist 
presents the crucial starting point for this operation (10, 
23), which in no sense pretends to value freedom (4b). 
Oddly enough, the term 'dialectic' is not to be found in 
the extensive index to the Coming Crisis. 
In a paper entitled 'Dialectical Sociology - An Exemplar 
for the 70's, Robert Friedrichs returns to examine Kuhn's 
paradigmatic style known as "the exemplar" or "concrete 
puzzle solution." Its author had held this to be a feature 
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only of natural scientific paradigms, but Friedrichs finds 
that it too, like its predecessors, has a place in sociology, 
particularly in understanding the machinations of the 
sociological establishment itself. 135 
Friedrichs draws on some earlier publications of his 
own in the area of religious and ethnic prejudice, and 
reinterprets the material in the light of h is mature 
theoretical interest in dialectical epistemology and the 
prophetic sociological mode (30a).136 He writes that it 
is his intention to demonstrate how "social change might 
be maximised by combining a dialectical understanding of 
social research with a prophetic image of the socioligist's 
calling, i.e., with a commitment to the altering of the 
given order that has been perceived" (7c).137 
Facing the question of prejudice and residential 
discrimination against negroes in urban America, Friedrichs 
looked at the research and found the indications were that 
typical churchgoers should be more bigotted than those who 
attended seldom or not at all. He made the assumption that 
frequent church attendance and other-direction would be 
linked, and that therefore, if re-definition of the situation 
were to be introduced (13a, 16d, 24), this group would be 
the more responsive. He next developed a surv y questionnaire 
to provide reliable data on these dimensions. He planned to 
communicate his "expected" findings via an "embarrassed" 
pulpit and "hoped" that on re-testing, the bigotted, frequent 
churchgoers would index the highest degree of attitudinal 
change on the question of the entry of blacks into their 
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own neighbourhood. There was indeed "a massive shift 
towards at least a verbal expression of tolerance on the 
part of the typical churchgoer." The extremes in attendance 
shared no attitude change. 
A notable feature of Friedrich's presentation of his 
research is that he avoids "alienated" and "scientistic" 
modes of accounting for what he did. He says deliberately 
"I hoped" not "I hypothesized", "I embarrassed" my subjects 
into a certain line of action, and so on; reflecting an 
existential involvement in his work (2b, 4b). The report 
also manifests a diachronic focus (15a); Friedrichs' 
research takes place in an ongoing social process : "The 
two major factors that I had not anticipated were that the 
clerical leadership of one of the churches changed hands 
during the process ... while the newly appointed clergyman 
was evidencing complete willingness to co-operate with my 
. d ' . d d ' d ,,138 alms ... an a C1V1C group e lcate to open occupancy 
arose, both factors speeding up the author's "hoped for" 
feedback. The mass media too, had begun to focus on the 
issue by this time. However, Friedrichs emphasises that 
the research program did serve as an independent variable 
in its own right. 
The 1972 report is a piece of consciousness raising 
aimed at the sociological profession. Friedrichs says that 
his original papers were conceived in conformity with the 
research exemplars of the dominant journals, and this over-
shadowed the author's original intent in pursuing this form 
of research . Having confessed this, Freidrichs takes up a 
~ .. ~. ~""----------------------------------------""""""II~~"~ 
polemical stand. He pleads that Radical Sociology commit 
itself to 
piece-meal dialectical research [of 
this kind] - empirical research 
unencumbered by grand schemes for 
the future (8a). For, each effective 
effort in the form of social research, 
transforms in some measure the social 
constructions that it reveals, -
including the social constructions 
that guide a nd motivate those who 
had framed the research (8c). 
The modesty of the exemplar I offer, he urges, "suits a 
future that dialectically escapes the ideologues net." 
(la).139 
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AlIlALY'l'l:C SUMMARY REFLEXIVE DIALECTICS 
paradigmatic features Sartre/Ber5ler & L/Young/Gouldner/Friedrichs 
].a DO philos. align. x 
b non f.1aJ::xist philos . 
c Hegel-early Marx x x 
d philos.late Marx 
2a unified science 
: b soc . method distn. x x x x 3a objectivist meta. x x 
~ b rel.ativist meta. x' 
c essentialist met3. . x 
4a soc. value free x 
b soc_somitted x x x 
Sa soc. nomothetic 
b sc:.c _ idiogr aphi c x 
c both ecomplement 
6a expl. ded ucti ve 
b expl.probabilistic 
c expl. functional 
d expl. genetic 
e expl.dialectical 
7a expl. -prediction 
b expl./descr.-undst. x 
c undst.-action (c.r.) x x x 
8a. method empirical x 
b method hermeneutic x x 
c both complement x 
9 analyses causal x 
10 analyses seek reasons x x 
11 analyses seek irmnanent x 
12 latent v. manifest m. x x 
13a determinism subj/obj x x 
b determinism obj/subj 
c determ.reciprocal x x x 
14a determinism whole/part x 
b determinism part/whole 
c determ.reciprocal x 
15a analyses diachronic x x x x x 
b analyses synchronic 
c both compl ement 
16a dia.is method 
b dia.is reality 
c dia.is meth.& reality 
d dia.is interaction m.r. x x x x x 
17a rejects formal logic x 
b uses formal logic 
l8a dia. simple contr ad. x 
b dia.multiple contrad. 
c dia.other factor 
19 physical dia. 
20 production dia. x 
21 institutional dia. x x 
22 intersubjective dia. x x x x 
23 intrasubjective dia. x x 
24 cognitive dia. x x x x 
25 structural (infra) dia. x 
26 uses law int.of opp. x 
27 uses law neg.of neg. x 
28 uses law of emergence x 
29a uses systems model x 
b uses conflict model 
c both complement 
30a applies dia. (exemplar) x x 
b perspective only x x x 
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Comments on the Summaries 
The reflexive dialecticians share five cardinal points _ 
a commitment to the methodological distinctiveness of social 
science; to its diachronic focus; to the dialectic as a 
phenomenon of interaction between the method and reality of 
social research; to an intersubjective sociology; and a 
cognitive dialectic. 
Sartre's philosophy manifests the strain between an 
idiographic and a nomological philosophy of history. There 
is ambivalence between the analyses of human reasons and 
of immanent factors. The deep 'structural' historical 
subjectivity reappears, somewhat ironically in an adversary 
of Levi-Strauss. Sartre's reference to the laws of dialectics 
is not a literal minded one as it was with the materialist 
Marxists before him. 
The dialectic of Berger and Luckmann combines an 
objectivist epistemology, causal emphasis and value freedom 
with a commitment to the methodological distinctiveness of 
sociology, to interaction and reciprocity. Again there is 
a fairly unconsidered application of the dialectic to many 
levels of phenomena, and the systems model reappears beneath 
it all despite the phenomenological flux. 
Young is another who uncritically combines an objectivist 
epistemology with an assumed reciprocity of subjective and 
objective factors. 
Gouldner's statement on the dialectic is too brief to 
contain any inconsistencies. 
-
81. 
Friedrichs 'exemplified' dialectic wants a complement-
arity of hermeneutic and empirical processes even though 
the two may require fundamentally conflicting epistemologies. 
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MARXIST DIALECTICS 
LEFEBVRE 
GUNDER-FRANK 
KARMEN 
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The heading Marxist dialectic groups together three 
sociologists who profess an orthodox Marxist-Leninist 
line. Engels' laws of dialectics - the interpenetration 
of opposites, the negation of the negation, and the law 
of emergence, are basic to their thought. They are 
characterised by a tendency to reify and a drive to 
systematize. 
Henri Lefebvre, now a professor at the University of Paris, 
sharply anticipated the other dialecticians here. His 
Logique formelle, logique dialectique first appeared in 
1946, but was extensively revised for a second debut in 
the Sixties. 140 The book is essentially a distillation 
of the orthodox Marxist theory of knowledge (ld) resting 
on the distinction between formal and dialectical or 
concrete logic (17a).141 Lefebvre describes the laws of 
dialectics (5a) as "supremement objectives, etant a la 
fois des lois du r~el et des lois de la pensee (16c, 19, 
) )... t ,142 24 , c'est ~ dIre, des lOIS de tout mouvemen ... ~ 
The abstract principles of formal logic, identity, causality, 
and so on, have little relevance to concrete thought. The 
latter manifests laws of "becoming", permitting neither 
deduction nor prediction, but manouvreing in dialectical 
rapport as a syllogism moves between the concrete and the 
universal, mediat d by the particular. 
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Lefebvre characterises the dialectical method by a 
series of laws: first, there is the universal law of 
interaction, treating of the connection or reciprocal 
mediation of all things (2a, 14c). To isolate a phenomenon 
is to deprive it of all meaning and content, he writes. 
It is a violation of nature by a comprehension based on 
metaphysics. Rational or dialectical research considers 
the phenomenon within the ensemble of its r e lations with 
other phenomena (8b). This constitutes its essential 
reality (11). 
The second law acknowledges the universality of 
movement through and between, internal and external, to 
these related phenomena. The dialectical method penetrates 
b e yond the superficial stability of appearances to the 
manifestations of becoming (3c). The fundamental connection 
of things, expressed by this movement, is reflected in the 
logical connection of ideas. 
Third in emphasis is the law of the unity of contradic-
tories e18a, 26). In formal logic the two aspects of 
a contradiction are mutually exclusive. Looking dialectically 
there exists simultaneously both inclusion and an exclusion, 
which Lefebvre calls active. The method seeks to comprehend 
the movement that has gi ven rise to these contradictions in 
order to find their resolution. 
Fourth, appears the law of the transformation of 
quantity to quality (28). Quantitative change is a slow 
and continuous becoming. Qualitative change, by contrast, 
may issue in tumult. It is brought about by internal 
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crisis in a thing, an intensification of its contradictions. 
Economic or political crises constitute examples (21). 
Human action, the subjective factor, intervenes, both to 
produce and to resolve such transformations. The point of 
crisis is intersected by an ensemble of realities, subjective 
and objective conditions, and it is called, after Hegel , 
the node. 
The fifth law treats of dialectical development as 
a spiral process "Ie retour au-dessous de depasse pour Ie 
dominer".143 It describes a change that does not involve 
the destruction of matter but envelops and deepens it (15a, 
27). Even between the living and the merely material there 
is a dialectical continuity. And then again, the living 
process is itself elaborated by thought. The basis of this 
understanding is but an organ, the human hand, "Ie point 
d'insertion perpetuel de netre raison concr~te dans 
l'interaction unive rselle" - Marx's praxis (20), though 
Lefebvre does not emphasise this term which has recently 
become so popular. 
This summary exposition of the laws of dialectics is 
followed by some rules of thumb from Lefebvre for the 
would be dialectician: go straight to the thing itself; 
locate the ensemble of connections integral to it, its 
characteristic movement; grasp both its contradictory 
aspects and its unity; analyse the internal conflict of 
these, the positive and negative tendencies; don't forget 
the mutual reliance of each thing upon another, its 
relativity, what is insignificant one moment becomes 
-
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essential the next ; look especially at transitions; 
don't forget that the deepening complexity of phenomena 
is infini te; always penetrate the simple observed co-
existences and proceed to the fundamental; regard the 
thinking process itself as it constantly transforms 
itself, go backwards and forwards in your steps actively 
reviewing these phases - and the dialectic will reveal 
itself as a productive and vigorous method (7b, 30b). 
In 1963 an article suggesting that it was now time for a 
theoretical convergence of the dialectic with functionalism, 
provoked the Marxist Andre Gunder-Frank to a reply which 
was published in the 1966 volume of Science and Society.144 
The author of the proposed "synthesis", Pierre van den 
Berghe, is right in that the two approaches are holistic 
(14a), asserts Gunder-Frank , but that is where the comparison 
e nds. The "whole" that the functionalist studies is no 
particular social whole, whereas for the Marxist it is the 
world wide capitalist system (ld). Second, the functionalist 
works from "the parts to the whole" and for this reason he 
sees conflict as "integrative". The Marxist however, will 
first 
" .analyse and explain the origin, nature 
and development (15a, 29a) of the entire 
social system and its structure as a 
whole, and then use the understanding of 
the whole thus gained, as the necessary 
basis for the analysis and understanding 
of its parts (8b, 30b).145 
It is unthinkable that th dialectic should be reduced 
to a static equilibrium model , for social reality is moved 
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by a disequilibrating negativity. The functionalist 
ignores revolutionary conflict but the Marxist can make 
use of both disintegrative and integrative situations 
because of his ability to deal with contradiction (18a, 
29c) . 
The fundamental distinction between the two theories 
on the question of evolution is also clear to Gunder-Frank. 
In functionalism" " .the social structure is the source 
of change, and not, as in Marxist theory, change the source 
of social structure ... ,,146 
In sum, argues Gunder-Frank, 
In order to achieve theoretical synthesis 
of functionalism and dialectics,functionalists 
must leave dialectics shorn of its theory 
and analysis of the formation, existence 
and transformation of the determinant social 
whole. They must deny the identification of 
this process with historical materialism as 
untenable, dismiss dialectical division and 
interpenetration of opposites (26) as confused, 
and regard extra-systematic stimuli as 
incompatible with dialectics. 147 
Gunder-Frank calls van den Berghe's attempt at synthesis 
"synthetic", but to be fair, he does not confront all the 
points raised, as will be seen when the functionalist himself 
is discussed. 
Perhaps the most hardheaded look at dialectics by a modern 
sociologist is Andrew Karmen's comparison of the Marxian 
perspective (1d, 30b) with the method of path analysis -
The Human Factor, 1972. 148 Path models, he comments, are 
built in order to replicate the workings of social phenomena, 
but these dissociate mechanisms, and break them down into 
discrete, isolated, fragmented components which can then 
be labelled and measured. The dialectical method on the 
other hand, denies the existence of mere collections of 
definite things in favour of interlocking social processes 
(14a) . 
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Path analysis forces all inter-relationships into uni-
directional cause and effect networks of operationalized 
variables, whereas dialectics excludes rigid causality and 
comprehends the instantaneous reciprocal influence of 
mutually interdependent and interpenetrating processes 
(17a, 26). 
The sources of change and influence in path models 
are external, but Karmen reminds the reader, the motor 
for growth, development and change are from a dialectical 
view, inherent factors, internal contradictions, opposing 
forces and disintegrative tendencies (18a). 
Path analysis requires continuous numerical variables 
for linear regression calculations which produce only 
quantitatively varying outcomes of the same kind, while 
dialectics postulates the possibility of qualitative change 
once a nodal point is reached (28). 
Karmen observes that path analysis, because it uses 
cross-sectional survey data , is limited to flat, a-historical 
slices through time. Yet, because of the focus on causal 
analysis, pr diction and statistical inference, it looks 
like sequential analysis. The dialecti cal method by contrast 
assumes a spiral process of emergence of the new from the 
old, in which higher stages negate out moded forms, 
relationships and arrangements (15a, 27). 
Karmen believes that path-analysis is a limiting 
research tool whose use precludes recognition of the very 
real need for social change. Dialectics is more than 
method for Karmen C16c). 
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ANALYTIC SUMMARY MARXIST DIALECTICS 
faradi9!!!ati c features Lefebvre/Gunder-Frank/Karmen 
la no philos.align. 
b non Mazxist philos. 
c: Hegel-early Marx 
d philos.late Marx x x x 
2a un:i:fied science x 
b soc . method distn . 
3a objectivist meta. 
b r elativist meta. 
c: essentialist meta. x 
4a soc. value free 
b soc. commi tted 
Sa soc. nOJI\Othetic x 
I b soc. idiographic 
c: both complement 
6a exp.l.deductive 
b exp.l. probabili s ti c 
c: expl. functional 
d expl.genetic 
e expl. dialectical 
7a expl.-prediction 
b expl. /desc.r. -undst . x 
c undst.-action (c.r. ) 
Sa method empirical 
b method hermeneutic x x 
c both complement 
9 analyses causal 
10 analyses seek reasons 
11 analyses seek immanent x 
~2 ~atent v. manifest m. 
J.3a determinism subj/obj 
b determinism obj/subj 
c determ.reciprocal 
~4a determinism whole/part x 
b determini sm part/whole 
c determ.reciprocal x x 
15a analyses diachronic x x x 
b analyses synchronic 
c both complement 
l~a dia.is method 
b dia • .is reality 
t: dia.is meth.& reality x x 
d dia.is interaction m.r. 
178 rejects formal logic x x 
I 
b uses formal logic 
~8a dia.simple c~ntrad. x x x 
b dia.1lIUl tiple contraIL 
t: ilia.other factor 
I 19 physical dia. x ~O production dia. x ~l institutional dia. x 
n intersubjective dia. 
~3 intrasubjective dia. 
:24 cognitive dia. x 
2.5 structural (infra) dia. 
~6 uses law int.of opp. x x x 
~7 uses law neg.of neg. x x 
~8 uses law of emergence x x 
~9a uses systems model x 
b "Uses conflict model 
c both compleme"l t x 
30a applies dia. (exemplar) 
b perspective only x x x 
lJL~ __________________ ~-~ 
91. 
Comments on the Summaries 
The Marxist dialecticians reveal a commonality of ten 
features - a basis in orthodox 1arxism; a hermeneutic 
approach; and diachronic focus; a comprehension of the 
dialectic as both method and reality; a rejection of formal 
logic; an emphasis on simple contradiction as the motive 
force; use of the three dialectical laws - interpenetration 
of opposites, negation of the negation and emergence and 
contribution of a dialectical perspective only. 
The materialist, objectivist stance of the Marxists 
is consistently used with an image of the dialectic as both 
method and reality but not the interaction of these. 
Lefebvre departs from this with his acknowledgement 
of the immanent, an essentialist credential. 
Gunder-Frank's acknowledgement of system leads him 
into trouble with the notion of reciprocity. 
Karmen is not really open to criticism. His article 
suggests alignment with the objectivist and nomothetic 
stream, but does not make a precise statement on this. 
.. --.~. ~""""------------"""""""""~"""BB""~"BB.a"~~~m!~!:~:h~~~~q 
STRUCTURALIST DIALECTICS 
LEVI-STRAUSS 
ALTHUSSER 
COULSON AND RIDDELL 
MURPHY 
. 
L...J... ____________ ~ 
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The cardinal feature of structuralism is the determination 
of individual phenomena by objective structures. These 
structures or totalities may be obvious, such as relations 
between economic factors, or they may be infrastructures, 
1 deeply buried in the human condition. The structuralist 
dialectic is anti-historical, only the analysis of relations 
in stasis is considered properly scientific and amenable 
to computer process. 
The structural anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss supposes 
that both "social reality" and "science" are dialectical 
(16c, 24). The source of this dialectic is deep in the 
human mind and its subsequent cultural objectifications. 
Consistent with the emphasis on the unity of the 
sciences found in both French and Marxist positivism (ld), 
L~vi-Strauss' concern, as stated in La Pens~e Sauvage 
(1962), is to locate culture within nature (2a): " ... 1 
believe the ultimate goal of the human sciences is not 
to constitute but to dissolve man ... the reintegration of 
culture in nature and finally of life within the whole of 
. . . . ,,149 A d h t its phYSlco-chemlcal condltlons.... n so, somew a 
ironically perhaps, he constructs after Kant,150 a theory 
of unconscious categories, the expression of organic 
structures in the brain. All possible meanings are given 
in the relationships between these structures (25); it 
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simply remains for the subject, object of this superior 
subjectivity (13a, 14a), to actualise them, and this is 
what happens when culture is formed. 
In order to explain the suppression of certain 
categories within some cultures, a theory of alienation 
is required, but this in turn, renews the split between 
nature and culture. The alienation theme is not stressed 
in his work, although he does see it as a spec ies of ideology 
critique. 
Structural anthropology aims to be a semiological 
science, but as Levi-Strauss points out: 
... man has meaning only on the condition 
that he views himself as meaningful ... 
it must be added that this meaning is 
never the right one: superstructures 
are faulty acts which have 'made it' 
socially. Hence it is vain to go to 
historical consciousness for the truest 
meaning. 151 
This rejection of experience in favour of another order of 
reality (11) puts Levi-Strauss at odds with the phenomenol-
ogists. Experience and reality are discontinuous, he urges, 
appearances do not pertain to the essence of things - and 
this point is crucial to his dialectical theory of explanation. 
Whenever man attempts to think about himself he becomes 
confused; only through the products of his mind can he be 
known. Kinship patterns and myths, both demonstrate the 
working of a latent infrastructure that is preoccupied with 
polarities, contraries and their transformations (27). 
Thus, as he puts it in an early methodological essay 'Social 
Structure' (1953), the apparent contingency of kin exchanges 
is explainable by reduction to a number of rules (5a). Not 
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however, by means of those rules or "conscious models, 
which are usually known as norms".152 The conscious 
model is not a structure. 
The social anthropologist proceeds from simple 
description of kin exchanges in the field or with the 
account of a myth, to a suspension of the time dimension 
and substitution of signs for the persons involved (15b). 
Coding the material in this way brings to li ght its 
structural properties,153 and comparison of several 
different institutions within one society or one 
institution across several different societies may 
elicit further common formal properties - the invariants 
which constitute the essential infrastructure (3c , 25). 
The model may be developed in one of two ways: the 
sign substitution may be made at the level of persons or 
other culturally meaningful units, and this is known as 
a mechanical model, or the substitution may be imposed on 
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statistical regularities. The choice between the two kinds 
of procedure follows the rationale of the exact sciences 
where " ... the theory of a small number of bodies belongs 
to classical mechanics, but if the number becomes greater, 
then one should rely on the laws of thermodynamics, that 
is, use a statistical model instead ... ~ (10).154 
Coding makes the material amenable to computer analysis 
(17b) through communications theory or the mathematics of 
games. It means that the unconscious or derived model can 
be subjected to experimentation, as the sign systems are 
arranged in various combinations and their possible 
transformations deduced. The structural model is thus 
both explanatory and predictive (6e, 7a). 
If, as we believe it to be the case, 
the unconscious activity of the mind 
consists in imposing form upon content , 
and if these forms are fundamentally 
the same for all minds ... it is necessary 
and sufficient to grasp the unconscious 
structure underlying each institution 
and each custom, in order to obtain 
a principle of interpretation (8b) 
valid for other institutions and 
other customs, provided of course , 155 
the analysis is carried far enough. 
It may seem puzzling to hear Levi-Strauss, adversary of 
Sartre and Ricoeur, talking in terms of "a principle of 
interpretation". But his semiology does involve an 
hermeneutic, and this operates at two levels. First 
there is the understanding of the cultural item as it 
is understood by those who live through it, " ... every 
anthropologist tries ... to put himself in the place of 
the men living there, to understand the principle and 
156 pattern of their intentions (10) .... II The second 
hermeneutic involves the translation of this into the 
anthropoligists' own frame of reference, that is , the 
construction of sign-systems which when deciphered, give 
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up the authentic or "structural principle" of interpretation. 
The structural or unconscious model however, may contradict 
(12, 18a) the meanings of the conscious model at certain 
points - namely where the infrastructure has been negated 
in its transformation into superstructure (21). Explanation 
by the structural model untwists this contradiction by 
asserting its opposite - a negation of the negation (27).157 
... a series of preliminary operations, 
that is, permutations or transformations 
... furnish the key to the correspondence. 
If this hypothesis is correct, we shall 
have to give up mechanical causality as 
an explanation and instead, conceive of 
the relationship between myth and ritual 
as dialectical ... ~58 
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Levi-Strauss talks about this "dialectical reason" towards 
the end of La Pensee Sauvage. It is "something additional 
in analytic reason" (17b), he writes, and its role is "to 
put the human sciences in possession of a reality which it 
alone can furnish them".159 
The author does offer an exemplar, but its loose and 
frankly arbitrary hermeneutic stages mean that it is more 
open to imitation than empirical replication (30a). 
The structuralist dialectic of Louis Althusser rests on a 
new "scientific problematic" that distinguishes sharply 
between dialectical materialism - a philosophy of practice 
and historical materialism - the scientific study of society. 
The "Hegelians", of course, do not uphold such a distinction -
the so called historicists, pragmatists, voluntarists and 
others with a "bourgeoise humanist" inclination. Lefebvre, 
Sartre and the Frankfurt School fall into this category along 
with Engels,160 whose insistence that the historical process 
itself enters into the very structure of the conceptual 
model is, for Althusser, nothing short of a denial of the 
possibility of authentic theorising (3a, 4a). 
The structuralist dialectic of Althusser, whose collected 
essays in For Marx (1966)161 substitute a systems analysis 
perspective (30a) for the German metaphysics that sustained 
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the original dialectic, takes its departure from what is 
identified as "an epistemological break" in Marx's writing 
occurring in 1845. From this date Marx's conception of 
history no longer rests on some universal essence of man, 
but on radically new concepts - scientific structures (ld, 
2a) - the social formation, forces and relationships of 
production, ideologies. The new problematic assumes the 
unity of human society, a totality, over and above the 
individual praxis (13b, 14a). Humanism remains here only 
as an ideological structure, "a social fact", to be 
considered in analysis. The Hegelian conception of the 
totality as expression of a single historical principle, 
Reason, becomes now "a de-centred totality" with many 
determinations. Contradiction as identity of contraries 
is replaced by "over-determination", a consequent of the 
inseparability of interactions within the structure. Marx 
himself had not worked sufficiently towards this pluralism , 
but Althusser claims to complete the method, at the same 
time turning attention from diachronic to synchronic 
analysis (15b). 
Althusser develops his dialectic of theoretical practice 
from some comments of Marx's in The Introduction to the 
Critique of Political Economy (1859)~62 1arx writes that 
though it seems to be correct to begin with the simplest 
concept, it is not . Analysis should proceed from the 
abstraction, the imaginary concrete, until the real and 
concrete is arrived at. Once this is attained, it can 
return to the abstraction, not as some indefinite integral 
whole, but the aggregate of many conceptions and relations 
(8b, 9). Althusser identifies the three stages of this 
process as three generalities. The 
first generality does not cOincide 
with the product of the scientific 
labour: it is not its achievement 
it is the prior condition. This ' 
first generality (which I shall call 
Generality I) constitutes the raw 
material that the science's theoretical 
practice will transform into specified 
'concepts', that is, into that other 
'concrete' generality (which I shall 
call Generality II), which is a kn owledge. 163 
99. 
Generality I, the thesis, is a synthesis of already elaborated 
concepts belonging to an earlier theoretical or "ideological" 
phase. The transformation of this through the encounter with 
a new body of material, the antithesis or Generality II, leads 
to the progress of science through organisation of knowledge 
on a new level or synthesis, Generality III. The movement or 
transformation of Generality I to Generality III is "a 
production process", an objectification, whereby knowledge 
assumes a concrete character, concrete-in-thought, that is 
(16c, 20, 24). This is what distinguishes the materialist 
dialectic from Hegel, who had conceived of the thesis as a 
self-transforming entity. 
A second contention wi th Hegel concerns the nature of 
contradiction which, Althusser insists, even though Lenin 
had not departed from the view, is more than a simple process 
with two opposites. Althusser's thinking here comes straight 
from Mao-Tse-tung who distinguished not only principal and 
secondary contradictions, but a principal and secondary 
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process would contain a single pair of opposites, but most 
social processes involve complex structures with multiple 
and uneven determinations, the dominant contradiction being 
responsible for the structural unity. But " ... the secondary 
contradictions are so essential even to the existence of the 
principal contradiction, that they really constitute its 
condition of existence, just as the principal contradiction 
constitutes their condition of existence.,,165 This is the 
substance of Althusser's unique contribution to dialectics _ 
over-determination (18b). "Only over-determination enables 
us to understand the concrete variations and mutations of a 
structured complexity such as a social formation, though not 
as the accidental variations and mutations produced by 
'external' conditions", for that would be to think 
mechanistically . In sum, whereas contradiction, the motive 
force, was negativity in Hegel, for Althusser " it cannot be 
reduced to the development of the idea of its own alienation ... 
rather it implies a real struggle, real confrontations, 
precisely located within the structure of the complex whole 
(21, 29a) ... ,.,166 
As the structuralist sees it, the social formation at 
any given moment is a "conjuncture" of autonomous forces -
economic, legal, ideological. These, corresponding to the 
original substructure-superstructure, are mutually determining 
and in Althusser's terms each has its "specific effectivity". 
He takes Mao's view, which in turn was inspired by Lenin, 
that the uneven development of the structures provides the 
contradictions within the totality and enhances yet further 
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transformations. The over-determination that characterises 
the totality may exist in antagonistic form where, operating 
by analogy with the Freudian idea of "condensation", forces 
will be compressed and an explosive or revolutionary situation 
result. Alternatively structural tensions may fuse or become 
"displaced", a transformation that makes for stability (26). 
The law of uneven development means that at anyone time 
there will be one particular "structure-in-dominance" , but 
in the final analysis (which is never made of course) the 
economic factor will be found to be its determinant (5a). 
An introductory text called Approaching Sociology (1970), 
by two young teachers of the discipline, Margaret Coulson 
and David Riddell, brought the structuralist dialectic into 
the classroom. 167 The authors who are radically opposed to 
functionalism illustrate their position by way of a 
comparison of American and Yugoslav textbooks, these 
representing what they call the "static-substantive" 
:1 versus "dynamic-structuralist" emphases respectively. 
Many of the mathematical tools developed by American 
sociology, they argue, are not suited to the analysis 
of interactive and holistic phenomena (14c) because they 
" ... depend on freezing social reality at a particular 
moment, and then predicting by assuming that the relations 
between factors are constant over time" (15a)168 - an error 
that Althusser could not possibly make, they observe. 
Coulson and Riddell commend Althusser's work on 
"overdetermination" (18b) but align themselves with a 
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This is a dialectical analysis.,,169 But they also use the 
term dialectical when speaking of the relationship between 
theory and empirical research and again of the relationship 
between social structure, consciousness and false consciousness 
(12). This is not a well defined statement on the dialectic 
(30b) . 
The most adventurous and enthusiastic exploration of 
dialectics in sociology is Robert Murphy's The Dialectics 
of Social Life (1971).170 The book entails, in part, a 
resume and evaluation of dominant strands in anthropological 
thinking - evolutionism, functionalism and structural-
functionalism; but this provides merely a counterpoint 
to the elaboration of the "negative" or dialectical tradition 
which is Murphy's main object. The author conceptualises 
his own basic opposition between "norm" and "action" and 
attempts to demonstrate that the theories of Hegel, farx, 
Freud, Simmel and Levi-Strauss each confronted this same 
dialectic. It is very much an exercise in creative theory 
building where the scaffolding is homemade but the bricks 
are stolen. Apart from the primary opposition between norm 
and action, Murphy's text makes reference to a number of 
other dialectical polarities which this simplified introduction 
juxtaposes to his overall theory. 
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Murphy finds that the first consensus in sociological 
theory, that of Radcliffe-Brown and Parsons, was faulty in 
tbat it subjected social life, which Durkheim earlier had 
recognised as consisting of "free currents perpetually in 
the process of transformation and incapable of being 
171 
mentally fixed by the observer" to static abstraction 
in the quest for its essential qualities. This meant a 
resort to one-dimensional categories - social facts would 
become manipulable if thought of as "things"; data would 
needs be fixed. Tbe reification of the social tended to 
project spatio-physical properties on to its subject matter. 
The upshot of this false materialism, in conjunction with 
the organicist model of society, was a difficulty in the 
conceptualisation of social change. 
The postulation of an equilibrium model at the social 
level, likewise deployed the focus of attention from 
individually produced variations in bebaviour. Tbe 
psychological level was largely taboo - tbough Durkbeim 
was ambivalent on this point, and Parsons deluded, according 
to Murphy. Furthermore, Parsons' schema of cultural social 
and personality systems was "really" a dual opposition 
between norm (represented by the cultural system and its 
extension the "role") and behaviour, on the other band. 
But, tbrough the instrumentality of socialisation, the 
social and personality systems were rendered unto the 
cultural level - inert, autonomous and self perpetuating. 
The structural-functional model thus could scarcely account 
for incongruities between norm and action or differences 
between action and ideas about action. Murpby argues that 
:c /:.~ 
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at every stage of social analysis three questions should 
be asked: "What do people really do? What do they think 
they are doing? What do they think they should be dOing?,,172 
Methodologically, Murphy identifies the dialectic as 
a critical approach in every sense of that word. This 
standpoint is made necessary as a result of the alientation 
of human existence, which the objectifying symbolic processes 
of the mind have brought about. "The continuity, wholeness 
and movement of the world of practical activity appears in 
the world of thought, language and culture, as discontinuity, 
limitation and fixity.,,173 The positivist operated under 
the assumption of a homology between the phenomenology of 
the mind and that of the world external to it; but to the 
dialectician, the process of symbolisation has meant that 
objects are "defined by what they are not" (3c). The object 
is characterised by a negativity that represents all those 
qualities excluded in the attribution of thingness. 
Dialectical thought thus "denies the objective validity 
of the here and now".174 The inherent negativity, 
"potentiality", will ultimately destroy the artificially 
constituted universe of common-sense thought. 
Murphy writes that 
The method (16c), and the epistemology, 
of dialectics is contained in this process 
of negation. According to the doctrine, 
time and force are more real than sub-
stantive things, and the essence of 
reality is the process of transformation 
of perceived reality. Things are not to 
be understood as fixed entities, but are 
in a continual state of transition into 
other forms of themselves. The structure 
of reality (16c) is a structure of 
oppositions, of elements that contradict 
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each other and limit each other's 
possibilities (14c, 26). Out of 
this clash of antagonistic tendencies , 
new forms arise that incorporate the 
opposing elements (28), albeit in 
altered form and with their contra-
dictions now resolved. 175 
Clearly the main features of the dialectic as under-
stood by Murphy can be found in Hegel's phenomenology (lc) 
which also taught that the estrangement of Subject and 
Object developed from the individual's fai l u r e to see that 
objectivity was constituted by his own mind as locus of 
reality. Murphy's "norm" versus "act" conflict is a 
reappearance of Hegel's Idea under the actualising force 
of the motive Will. This transformation of a form into 
a new form revealing its yet unrealised character, is 
summarised by the thesis-antithesis-synthesis triad (27), 
a logical unity, Murphy urges, not a temporal sequence. 
The containment by a form of its own negation is expressed 
in the formula of non-identity, A = non A (17a), for "the 
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definition of a phenomenon does not lie in an inner quality 
that endows and gives substance to the phenomenon, it derives 
from its boundaries or limits, the parameters beyond which 
it becomes something else. Things have no independent 
autonomous existence but exist only in their relationship 
to other things. ,,176 
The dialectical exercise ... requires us 
to look for paradox as much as 
complementarity, for opposition as 
much as accommodation .... It portrays 
a universe of dissonance (29b) under-
lying apparent order and seeks deeper 
orders beyond the dissonance. It urges 
critical examination ... of ... commonsense 
interpretations of reality that lie at 
the core of our cultural systems ... the 
result of all this may fall far short 
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of ... the discovery of general social 
laws (5b) ... 177 [For] the total impact 
of a dialectic is destructive of neat 
systems. 178 
Murphy traces the opposition of Will and Idea in the 
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idealist dialectic of Reason, forward into Marx's materialist 
dialectic of History. Marx's singular contribution was the 
substitution of class interests for Will, as the active 
principle, and he reversed the Hegelian p riority so that 
action assumed primacy over idea. Mind or consciousness, 
thus came to be regarded more as the product of history 
rather than its genitor. But the Marxist theory of the 
determination of consciousness was not a sociological 
determinism in the positivist sense. According to Murphy, 
if one works from the earlier Marx, it is the active praxis 
which shapes both the world and the idea (lc). Ideas and 
reality are divorced only where praxis is not informed by 
revolutionary intent. When man attempts to resolve the 
contradictions of his condition and misapprehends or inverts 
the social reality - ideology is the product , and false 
consciousness the result. "Man produces illusions of the 
world (24), which by becoming social have an empirical 
reality of their own. The levels of culture and social 
action (21) are, therefore, non-homologous because of a 
contlnuing dialectic between mind and society.,,179 
Murphy's own singular contribution to the dialectic 
is his attempt to extend its operation into the individual 
and psychological sphere (23), and to make this workable as 
social theory by continuing to identify the concepts of norm 
and action as the crucial polarity. First Murphy sets out 
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to show how Freud, perhaps the greatest of psychologists, 
was entirely committed to a dialectical view of psychic 
functioning. Parsons' version of Freud, which has penetrated 
social thought is a violent deviation from this position. 
In Murphy's opinion the master was decidedly and consistently 
non-structural and non-positivist in his treatment of 
personality. The latter was understood as a flux of 
ambivalence and negation, transformation and becoming. 
The dynamic was conflict, introduced by the demands of 
social life, and its outcome was the defensive suppression 
of truth. Sublimation, one such means of dealing with 
the individual versus society dialectic, turned back again, 
creatively, feeding the external, socio-cultural realm. 
This psycho-analytic parallel with the objectivation process 
has been treated at length by Marcuse . 180 The surrender 
of the individual to the wider society was symbolised by 
the Oedipal resolution - a negation of the negation - as 
Murphy sees it, but on the whole the individual remained 
an imperfectly socialised being, whose daily life manifested 
the continuing struggle of activity against norm, of organism 
versus society in Berger and Luckmann's terms. 
In his drive towards synthesis, Murphy has over-
simplified the dialectic in Freudian theory. The mind 
here is a tripartite entity and so offers the possibility 
of three qualitatively distinct interior conflicts. The 
introduction of the social, "other", adds at least a fourth -
an external dialectic to the matrix, and so on. 181 The 
lack of a carefully specified referent for the word dialectic 
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considerably weakens the value of Murphy's thesis here, 
as elsewhere. Throughout his discussion of Simmel, for 
example, one becomes aware of references to the interplay 
of "mind" versus "interaction"; 
"consciousness" versus 
"society"; "image" versus "reali ty"; "subject" versus 
"object"; "self" versus "culture" ; each of which diverges 
slightly from the "norm" versus "action" dialectic that 
Murphy is pursuing. 
Simmel's status as a dialectician was established 
by Coser in 1956. 182 Here too, there was emphasis on 
ambivalence and change and Simmel was also conscious of 
the alienation question. He saw in the subject-object 
dualism "a radical contrast: between subjective life, 
which is restless but finite in time, and its contents, 
which, once created are fixed but timelessly valid ... ~ 
The creation of the mind, that is, culture, assumed 
autonomy and demonstrated "an immanent logic of development" 
indifferent to the human condition. 183 
The dialectic between the individual and the collective 
demonstrated for Simmel by the conflict which, he observed, 
is "a necessary counterpart of positive sociation", and 
further by the fact that " ... the very inclusiveness central 
to the definition of the group, bespeaks its exclusiveness ... ~ 
Meanwhile, "lies, illusion and ignorance" appeared to him as 
184 essential to social interaction as knowledge. Generally, 
Simmel tended to find that norms were fairly irrelevant in 
daily life while rituals of conduct received much attention. 
At this point, Murphy leaps from Simmel to Claude L~vi-Strauss, 
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whose structural theory offers the conceptualisation par 
excellence of this disparity between norm and action. 
This has already been discussed however, and will not be 
taken any further bere. 
The norm versus action theme is not new to anthro-
pological thought. Boas observed that they were commonly 
out of phase with each other; and he believed tbat actions 
generally were more stable than ideas. Rob e rtson-Smitb's 
theory of ritual or action as prior to belief, was another 
case; he considered beliefs to be rationalisations of 
behaviour. 184a In fact, as Murphy illustrates, even 
Durkheim and Radcliff-Brown's writing can be interpreted 
along these lines. What is strange is that although Hegel, 
Marx, Freud and Simmel all have appreciated that actions 
and intentions may be out of phase, it is a professional 
disregard of this phenomenon which has kept sociologists 
in business over the years. There is a constant pursuit 
(and hence assumption) of rationality, i.e., congruity 
between action and norm. Sociologists strain for consistency. 
Murphy claims that his thesis is crucial to a 
dialectical theory of knowledge. 
It implies that people react to normative 
systems and that their behaviour may be 
systematically non-congruent with the 
norms (21, 23, 24). Their ideas of the 
social world do not correspond with its 
phenomenology but are part of the 
phenomenology .... One source of error in 
the conventional perception of the world 
is that it is teleologicals or oriented to canons of relevance ... ~ 5 
Dialectics and phenomenology are both committed to the 
"false consciousness" argument. 
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The dialectical questioning of these 
common-sense categories of experience 
has an analogy in the phenomenological 
notion of "multiple realities" ... the 
phenomenologist and the dialectician 
both stress the conventionality of our 
images of everyday activity (12), and 
state that this level of reality is 
warped, bounded, and incomplete. 186 
The dialectical method then, follows Levi-Strauss' two 
level hermeneutic (8b, 10, 11). 
Murphy remarks that on the whole there i s "enormous 
elasticity in the systems of social action, allowing the 
actors to thread their way through the culture rather than 
conform to its norms. ,,187 Sketching out the dialectic of 
norm and action in more detail (30b), he finds that the 
two poles are contradictory in form and content (18a). In 
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form, norms which are thought about, verbalised and codified 
are specific and bounded. In content , norms are diffuse, 
multiple and unbounded. Actions which tend to be unique 
and situation responsive are less articulated, more diffuse 
in form. Actions are always specific in content , however. 
"Activity is sequential in time, continuous and non-
repetitive; norms are timeless, discontinuous, repetitive 
and one dimensional. Norm and activity seldom meet, and 
there must always be strain between them ... [But there are 
some] norms and actions [which] by partaking of each others' 
qualities could serve as mediators of the contradiction 
between norm and act.,,188 A hopeful note? 
The sum of Murphy's manifesto is this: 
The sociological separation of cultural, 
social and personality systems, assumes 
that the three together form the totality 
of social life, but that each is an 
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expression of the other on a different 
analytic level. We would suggest them 
as a unity, but a dialectical one. 
Rather than being expressions of each 
other, they are transformations of each 
other, and the totality of social life 
is a product of their clash. This is 
an untidy, conflict-prone model, but 
we may ask whether or not it indeed 
represents the world as we know it.189 
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ANALYTICAL SUMMARY STRUCTURALIST DIALECTICS 
Earadi2!!atic features Levi-Strauss/Althusser/Coulson & R/MurEhy 
la no phi los. align. 
b non MarAist philos . 
c Hegel-early Marx 
x d philos.late Marx x x x 2a unified science x x 
b soc.method distn. 
3a objectivist meta. x 
b relativist meta. 
c essentialist met~. x x 4a soc. value free x 
b soc. committed 
Sa soc.nomothetic x x 
b soc. idiographic 
x 
c both complement 
6a expl.deductive 
b expl.probabilistic 
c expl. functional 
d expl.genetic 
e expl.dialectical x 
7a expl. -prediction x 
b expl./descr.-undst. 
c undst.-action (c.r. ) 
8a method empirical 
b method hermeneutic x x x 
c both complement 
9 analyses causal x 
10 analyses seek reasons x x 
11 analyses seek ilTUllanent x x 12 latent v. manifest m. x x x 13a determinism subj/obj x 
b determinism obj/subj x 
c determ.reciprocal 
14a determinism whole/part x x 
b determinism part/whole 
c determ.reciprocal x x 
lSa analyses diachronic x 
b analyses synchronic x x 
c both complement 
16a dia. is method 
b dia. is reality 
c dia. is meth.& reality x x x 
d dia. is interaction m.r. 
17a rejects formal logic x 
b uses formal logic x 
18a dia. simple contrad. x x 
b dia. mUltiple contrad. x x 
c dia. other factor 
19 physical dia. 
20 production dia. x 
21 institutional dia. x x x x 
22 intersubjective dia. 
23 intrasubjective dia. x 
24 cognitive dia. x x x 
25 structural (infra) dia. x 
26 uses law int.of opp. x x x 
27 uses law neg.of neg. x x 
28 uses law of emergence x 
29a uses systems model x 
39b uses conflict model x 
c both complement 
30a applies dia. (exemplar) x 
b perspective only x x x 
, /_:1 
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Comments on the Summaries 
The structuralist dialecticians manifest eight major 
characters - an alignment with later or orthodox Marxism ; 
an hermeneutic method; interest in the play of latent as 
opposed to manifest meanin g; a view of the dialectic as 
both a method and something in reality itself; and that 
is expressed in both cognitive and institutional spheres 
use of the law of the interpenetration of opposites and 
recognition of the dialectic as a perspective only. 
Levi-Strauss' commitment to the unity of the sciences 
and his methodologi cal essentialism leads him into a pitfall 
of many Marxists. So does his combination of nomological 
interest and hermeneutic procedure. The attention to latent 
and manifest meaning levels leads him to seek both human 
reasons for action and immanent forces, a seemingly illogical 
I 
position that is rescued only by postulation of the 
transcendental historical subject-objectivity. Again in 
agreement with his Marxism the dialectic is viewed as a 
I 
method and a real thing but not an interaction of the two. 
Althusser also demonstrates the Marxist tendency to join 
objectivity and hermeneutic interpretation together. There 
I is not really an infra structural dialectic in Althusser. 
His transcendental historical force is really an economic 
I 
entity, and therefore an objective institutional structure, 
rather than a psychological one. The cognitive dialectic 
: demonstrated by Althusser applies to his method and again 
: is a material (production) proc ss. 
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Coulson and Riddell do not spell out their dialectic 
in enough detail for any analytic treatment of it. 
Murphy's phenomenological image of the dialectic is 
out of character with his appreciation of it as method 
and reality without interaction of the two. His allocation 
of the dialectic to many 'levels' of analysis is indiscriminate. 
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FUNCTIONALIST DIALECTICS 
GURVITCH 
CAZANEUVE 
VAN DEN BERGHE 
COLE 
SCHERMERHORN 
GROSOF 
PERINBANAYAGAM 
SCHNEIDER 
BLAU 
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Functionalism rests on a fusion of the social organism 
analogy with an objectivist view of social reality. The 
social whole, system or gestalt is a product of normative 
consensus, which integrates conflicting interests by 
institutionalizing disruptive tensions. The system is 
thus a clockwork of interrelated parts, an equilibrium 
model, where explanation is in terms of the needs of the 
whole. The functionalist dialectic introduces dialectical 
mediation to its treatment of th relationship between 
part and whole. 
Georges Gurvitch, author of Dialectique et sociologie 
116. 
(1962) - was probably the first to attempt the establishment 
of an actual "dialectical sociology".190 His brand of 
dialectic, "empirico realist", conforms recognisably to 
th organicist traditions of French social thought, which 
is not surprising since Gurvitch was a successor to Durkheim's 
Chair at the Sorbonne and editor of Cahiers internationaux 
de sociologie. 
Gurvitch sees his empirico-realist dialectic as part 
of the progressive "dialectization" of the exact sciences 
in the 20th century. This methodological revolution 
affected physics first, with Bohr's complementarity 
principle, according to which two equally valid but 
mutually xclusive theories might not be applied at 
~.----.. ~~--------------------------------~~ 
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the same time, since one would destroy the viewpoint of 
the other. Next, the general theory of relativity erased 
the universal conceptions of time and space in favour of 
a multiplicity of space-times. Finally, came Heisenberg's 
demonstration of the impossibility of simultaneous measurement 
of the position and activity of microphysical entities. 
The culmination of these developments occurred in 1947 with 
the institution of an academic review Dialectica under the 
Swiss mathematician and philosopher Ferdinand Gonsetb. The 
journal was to be directed at a clarification o f conceptual 
and experimental difficulties within the ambit of dialectics. 
But Gurvitch writes, generally this interdisciplinary 
awareness failed to confront the fundamental aspects of 
the relationship between the natural and social sciences. 
In particular, there has been a failure to appreciate the 
special nature of the humanities (2b), where use of the 
dialectic leads to a compounding of difficulties, for, not 
only the method, but "la realite humaine et sociale est 
l A d ' 1 . ,,191 el e-meme la ectlque . 
The discovery of the dialectic within social reality 
Gurvitch attributes to Fichte's studies in morality and 
natural law. Proudhon, Marx and recently Sartre have 
developed this "material" dialectic, but not in an anti-
dogmatic manner. 192 The dialectical method as exercised 
by Gurvitch will liberate the social sciences from 
philosophical biases (la): "la dialectique debarrasse 
des vieilles opPositions d'ecole telles que materialisme , 
positivisme, spiritualisme, rationalisme, criticisme ou 
sensualisme, tout en ouvrant la voie ... " to a synthesis 
193 
of all scientific knowledge. 
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I 
I 
This essentially "negative" character of the dialectic 
is among its most recurring and therefore most authentic 
qualities. But dialectics alone is a vain pursuit , only 
an empiric dialectic (8a), writes Gurvitch, will allow 
the "purification" of knowledge by the confrontation with 
experience which opens it to negation. Further than this, 
the critical attitude of the dialectician involves his 
denial of formal logic (17a), and beyond th is , the abstract 
and discursive (and with it rhetorical notions) are rejected 
too. The dialectic typically combats what is static in the 
real world and the artificial crystallisation of knowledge 
that conceptualisation gives it. It seeks instead to 
penetrate the complexity, "flexibility" and sinuosity of 
reality. It exposes tensions, "oppositions", contraries 
and contradictories (true antinomies or polarities), and 
the mutual conditioning of these (though not the contra-
dictions) e18a, 26). It traces through the intermediat e 
stages of such oppositions - quantity and quality (28), 
liberty and determinism, for example. And its fourth 
enduring characteristic focuses on the simultaneous 
"movement" of wholes and their constitutive elements 
and the reciprocal interaction between these (14c). The 
movement of unity to multiplicity and of multiplicity to 
unity is presupposed in this. 
The dialectic for Gurvitch has a threefold expression. 
It is a real movement (16b): 
C'est la voie prise par totalites 
humaines ... et la lutte que ces 
totalites m~nent contre les obstacles 
int e rnes et ext e rnes .... " 
, 
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It is a method: 
La mani~re de connattre adequatement 
le movement des totalites sociales 
r~elles et historiques ... toutes les 
sciences, m@me naturelles ou ~xactes, 
ont affaire a des cadres de r~f~rence 
plus ou moins artificiels eu intervient 
l'humain, et par son intermediaire, la 
perspective sociale. 
Its third expression is: 
La rapport dialectique qui s'etablit 
entre l'objet construit par une sCience, 
la methode employee et l'~tre reel (16d). 
Or l'intervention de cette dialectique 
est particulierement intense en sociologie 
... [ou] les totalites reeles etudies sont 
penetrees par de multiple significations 
humains ... ~94 
Only the unification of these three expressions "a 
dialectization of the dialectic" will open the way to 
apprehension of the "total social reality". 
Gurvitch's assessment of the differences between the 
sciences of men and of nature leads him to re-examine the 
appropriateness of the dialectic of complementarity for 
social analysis. He finds that in fact, in the social 
sciences, no less than five such operational procedures 
are called for. These he applies both in his treatment 
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of social phenomena and in his analysis of the relationships 
between the disciplines. The "dialectic of complementarity" 
(8c, 29c) he describes as pointing to alternatives, real 
or conceptual, which at second glance are found to be 
complementary in relation to each other, since each provides 
an aspect of reality or point of view that is lacking in 
the other. Another complementarity dialectic is that of 
"compensation" or orientation in an inverse direction, the 
third, complementarity of "double orientation", represents 
, 
I 
a compounding of the second form, with movement in two 
directions as befits the pluri-dimensional constitution 
of social reality. 
The "dialectic of mutual implication" points to 
alternatives, real or conceptual, which at second glance 
are found to interpenetrate each other to a degree (13c, 
14c) . In other words, they are not, as in the 
complementarity dialectic, mutually exclusi ve terms. 
The relationship of social and psychological phenomena 
is a case in point. 
The "dialectic of ambiguity" points to the fact that 
positive and negative valuations may characterise the same 
object . The social network, for example, generates both 
security and constraint. Extreme ambiguity may develop 
into ambivalence and eventually elements of the structure 
become antinomic. 
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The "dialectic of polarisation" points to this antinomic 
organisation of elements in a situation, whether arising 
from relations of complementarity, mutual implication or 
ambiguity. This is the classic dialectic of opposites (26) 
and Gurvitch claims that, in its distinct form, it is not 
often found in social reality. It has special pertinence 
to the study of alienation, social disintegration , conflict 
and acculturation. 
The "dialectic of the reciprocity of perspectives" 
points to alternatives, real or conceptual, which are neither 
identical nor totally separate, and which are symmetrical 
in outcome. The mutual conditioning of individual and 
1 
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collective processes in the historical totality is one 
such manifestation, but this itself takes place only in 
a context of polarisation and dialectical ambiguity. 
The context in which Gurvitch envisages this 
dialectic is an irreducible reality of "social facts" 
(3a), "a complex of dynamic and fluid systems" made up 
of unstructurable, structurable, and structured" phenome na 
(29a).195 This sociology is divided into mic ro and macro 
aspects. The microsociology (22) deals with the 
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instructurable classes of sociability, the various relations 
between ego and alter, their intensity and constraint. The 
macrosociology is an expanded classification of the totalities 
(21) which go to make up the total social reality. These 
are the structurable elements of which Gurvitch recognis e s 
ten depth levels ranging from the morphological or eco-Ievel 
of the statisticians, through organised and symbolic 
patterns of conduct to hidden psychic dispositions (23). 
The levels penetrate each other by means of the dialectical 
' . 1 processes just described. The actual structured totalities , 
groupings, classes and even global societies (i.e., capitalism) 
are weighted according to function, size, duration, rhythm , 
organisation, and so on, running to fifteen criteria in all. 
Beyond this is Gurvitch's notion of social structure , 
which is alien to the mainstream of structuralist thought 
and quite difficult to grasp. It seems to represent a 
gestalt or equilibrium system (29a) made up with reference 
to sociability, the depth levels, social time196 and the 
symbolic expressions of organised activities. 
/ 71 
. 
Gurvitch assures the sociologist that with the set 
of interlocking matrices provided by these multifarious 
dimensions, he can pinpoint exactly the nature of his 
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object. But this sociology is never more than a typology 
(5a): and he admits - it tends "towards" explanation only. 
This is not to say that explanation in sociology is 
impossible in his view, but accurate predictability via 
causal laws is extremely rare. Determinat ion is such a 
relative and multiform thing. For instance, social 
determinisms belonging to the a-structural microsociological 
frameworks are conceptually separate from the sociological 
determinisms of concrete global societies (29a). Yet even 
the latter are not conducive to probabilistic generalisations, 
owing to their dialectical nature. The a-structural, 
structurable and structured elements are constantly in 
conflict with each other, only reference to the total 
social phenomenon can serve as the basis for explanation. 
But even here a single causal line is always doubtful. 
Instead, sociology demonstrates "functional correlations" 
between two elements in a system , and patterns or tendencies 
towards regularity over time (6b, 9). 
Other elements may be explained by direct "understanding" 
of their presence in ~he social whole (7b). Gurvitch insists 
that while history answers the "why" questions better than 
sociology does, the two disciplines complement each othe r 
(15c): " ... une science historique continuiste qui etudie 
une realit€ historique inclinant ... vers la discontinuite ... 
une sociologie discontinuiste par sa methode typologique, 
, 
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qui ~tudie une realit~ sociale relativement plus continuiste 
que celIe qui releve de l'histoire.,,197 Gurvitch's writing 
on explanation resembles that of the other French 
dialecticians, Lefebvre and Althusser. The movement of 
explanation is from abstract to concrete, with domination 
of the whole over the parts (14a); and the process of 
explanation is scarcely distinguished from understanding 
for these are another complementary pair. 
Determinism is the integration of 
particular facts into one of the 
real, multiple frameworks or concrete 
universes (actually known or constructed) ; 
it situates these facts, that is 
explains them in relationship to 198 
its understanding of the framework (30b). 
Gurvitch believes that experiment~on has only limited 
success in sociology, observation is preferable. A study 
in controlled observation by Cazaneuve and other disciples 
of Gurvitch - 'Enquete sociologique sur la connaissance 
d' autrui' 199 illustrates his approach with a comparison of 
social class differences in person perception (30a). 
Enlarging on Scheler's theory of the immediate 
experience of other selves, the authors surmised that 
both direct apprehension and knowledge of others should 
be active in interpersonal perception and that these should 
feed or modify each other through the dialectics of 
complementarity (8c, 29c), mutual implication (13c, 14c), 
and polarisation (26) . A hypothesis was formed that the 
mode of perception used by a subject in his perception 
of others is related to the social grouping to which he 
belongs, and hence modified by the degree to which he is 
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1nt grated into this grouping. It was felt that such a 
study should be carried out on a group that had been 
ongoing for some time and which had a developed social 
structure (21) and microcosms of sociability (22). For 
this reason eight occupational groups representing the 
categories - intellectual, industrial, administrative and 
rural were selected and subjected to partially structured 
depth interviews on their attitudes to a work partner. 
The interview schedule sought to determine direct intuitions 
of the other: "what was striking at first glance?": use 
of stereotypes, "what permits you to reach a more precise 
image?": the influence of others in the group on the image 
formed and the relative importance of verbal and non-verbal 
cues. The responses to the questions were treated as a 
yes/no option (17b). The number of positive responses per 
item were compared for each group and presented graphically. 
Descriptive statistics only, appear to have been used. 
Bosserman reports that the central hypothesis expecting 
a positive correlation between forms of knowledge and 
social frameworks was validated (6b, 8a). Analysis of 
trends showed a particularly strong difference between 
intellectual and industrial groups on the first item _ 
intuitive perception. Verbal and non-verbal communications 
were found to be relied upon equally by all groups. Generally, 
each group exhibited a characteristic profile of perceptual 
techniques. 
Basically this study is a mere collation of what 
Gurvitch calls "functional correlations" and the specific 
./.,#, 
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role of dialectical operations mentioned at the outset 
does not receive any further attention. The student of 
dialectics will have to look elsewhere for convincing 
applications of Gurvitch's conceptualisation of the 
tradition. 
The next publication to draw attention to a dialectic of 
a functionalist sort is Pierre van den Berghe 's 'Dialecti c 
and Functionalism' in the American Sociological Review, 
1963.
200 
Its author, it will be recalled, believes that 
both traditions fail to provide a complete model for 
society, but that put together, they do constitute one. 
The functionalist or structural-functionalist 
approach as formulated by Parsons, Merton and Davis 
involved the following postulates, according to van den 
Berghe : societies should be considered historically as 
systems of interrelated parts; causation is multiple 
and reciprocal; social systems, though never totally 
integrated, maintain a state of dynamic equilibrium; 
dysfunction, tension or deviance tends to be resolved 
or institutionalised by built in adjustive mechanisms; 
changes are generally gradual and adaptive, sudden change 
affecting mainly the superstructure; the value system 
facilitates socio-cultural integration through imposition 
of a consensus; the sources of change may be external to 
the system, occur through internal differentiation, or 
through innovation. 
Van den Berghe finds that on examination, conflict 
and dissention are aspects of social reality as essential 
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as consensus is (29c), and that the supposed connection 
between consensus and integration cannot honestly be 
regarded as a necessary one. Integration may favour 
change, while stability and inertia give rise to 
disequilibrium. The functional model also has difficulty 
accounting for the fact that adaptations to external forces 
may be maladjustive, while there is no place at all for 
revolutionary change. What particularly interests the 
author is the role of contradiction and internal conflict 
in development, something which the incomplete emancipation 
of functionalism from organicism has so far disallowed. 
The article thus offers an expanded equilibrium model that 
will meet these shortcomings. 
This reformulation using "a minimum dialectic" 
entails that "the social structure (be recognised) as 
the source of a crucial type of change" and that this 
may be the product of "contradiction and conflict between 
two or more opposing factors" (18b) 201 such as values, 
roles or institutions. The minimum dialectic may operate 
at the conceptual level (24) (Hegel's contribution), at 
the level of opposition between groups (21) (Marx's), and 
on the level of institutionalized interests such as 
autonomous structures. This third level is difficult 
to envisage. Logically it would seem to represent a 
blend of the other two. 
The reconciliation between this dialectic and 
functionalism is considered possible on the grounds that 
both are holistic approaches (14a). Van den Berghe qualifies 
this however; the former leans towards unidirectional 
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causation (9) and conflictual interdependence, the 
latter to reciprocal causation and integra~ive inter-
dependence . Nevertheless, both consistently underestimate 
the autonomy of parts in the social whole. The second 
convergence is in the key concepts of consensus and 
conflict; both overlap in their roles, consensus leading 
to either integration or diSintegrati o n and conflict 
behaving likewise. The third point conce r ns the 
evolutionary nature of change in the two theories. The 
functional differentiation and the dialectical spiral 
both imply a succession of stages in which elements of 
an early phase are reorganized in a later and more advanced 
modification (28). Finally van den Berghe comes to the 
strongest area of rapprochement between the two , the 
equilibrium model. The dialectical triad with equilibria 
at thesis and synthesis and disequilibrium at antithesis 
(27) is such a cycle; there are elements of inertia in 
both schemes, integration or resolution are recurring 
phases. 
Van den Berghe claims that the new blend involves a 
rejection of both Hegel's and 1arx's monocausal theories , 
and Marx's and Dahrendorf's use of binary models. 
Polarisation writes van den Berghe, 
... is an empirical tendency rather than 
a necessary condition of conflict. A 
pluralistic model thus seems to impose 
itself. If one argues that dualism is 
intrinsic to dialectical thinking, I am 
prepared to abandon the term 'dialec tic', 
though not the elements thereof which 
are essential to a balanced view of 
social reality.202 
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In passing, it is noteworthy that van den Berghe's 
bibliography contains no references to dialectical thinkers, 
unless Coser and Dahrendorf be so classified, while some 
twenty or more articles on functionalism are listed. 
A second proposed convergence of structural-functionalism 
and dialectics was developed by Robert Cole in the 
Sociological Quarterly , 1966. 203 Marx's d ialectic of the 
history of class society was over specialised and yet not 
specific enough according to Cole. The real concern is 
when, in what way and which dialectical meohanisms are 
effective and how these interact with integrative forces 
in society to shape a given outcome. 
Cole argues for a pragmatic and empirical (8a) 
"assessment of the net balance of the aggregate of 
consequences,,204 as opposed to the "dogmatic and mystifying 
notion of dialectics as an all pervading principle of 
reality which explains change by showing how each entity 
calls forth its own negation. Conflict is "empirically 
both a normal and essential element of the social struc ture."205 
This is why Dahrendorf's advocacy of function and conflict 
models as optional analytical schemes is inadequate, the 
two approaches must be resolved (15c, 29c). The immediate 
goal is thus one of "disengaging the dialectic from its 
ideological moorings (la) and making it trim for sociological 
analysis. " 
The functional system, writes Cole, traditionally 
consists of two sorts of elements - the social structure 
~ ~ .. ~.. ~ .... ----------------------------.......................................... ~~--~ 
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and its component items. The activity of the researcher 
here is an "interpretation of items (both at the level of 
values and institutions) by establishing their consequences 
for the larger structures in which they are implicated.,,206 
Parsons' preoccupation with normative relations resulted 
in neglect of the sources of instability however. It is 
obvious that the presence of some items may threaten the 
maintainence of the structure, while others, structural 
constraints, compensate for these. The constraints operate 
as equilibrating factors only up to a certain point, but 
beyond this, strains or tensions - Merton's "dysfunctions" 
show up. The latter's formulation though, ignores the 
"fundamental ambivalence which derives from the essential 
negativity of all existing structures (3c)", the inherent 
contradictions (18b).207 
Sociologists have traditionally concentrated on 
unilinear functions, variables, but the dialectical view 
is based on the assumption of interlocking processes (14c). 
Constraints and support systems may be interlocking, for 
example, those who benefit from the established order will 
be instrumental in setting up other structures which 
strengthen it. But this also implies that change, generated 
in one, is facilitated by transfer through the others. The 
functionalist model of structural differentiation thus 
reveals inadequate comprehension of internally produced 
change. 
Cole continues " ... when the dialectical mechanisms 
(3a, 16b) are barely superior to the integration mechanisms, 
we should expect (9, 21) a relatively continuous process 
. 
-of change (evolution) ... when the dialectical mechanisms 
are clearly superior, we would expect rapid discontinuous 
change (revolution) . . . ~208 The time factor is important 
in another way as well, for the functional consequences 
of an item at one time may be dysfunctional at another 
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time and under another set of circumstances. The phenomenon 
resembles Schneider's category "the anti c ipated versus 
unanticipated consequences of social action. ,, 209 Over-
specialisation has a similar paradoxical effect , since 
by denying adaptive flexibility it leaves an institution 
open to unanticipated eventualities. 
Cole commends Marx for his perception of ambiguity 
in relation to the capitalist organisation of labour which , 
if undesirable, did at least allow for the rational 
exploitation of material resources. Marx's analysis was 
wrong in its ultimate prediction, however, because it 
failed to take account of socially integrative mechanisms 
along with the dialectical ones. It is not enough to 
assume simply an intensification of the dialectic and 
consequent revolutionary overthrow of the prevailing 
structure. Sometimes oligarchy may replace democracy, 
sometimes a totalitarian structure will, it depends on 
"the balance of operative factors" (18b). 
Weber's model of the decline of democracy was more 
accurately dialectical in Cole's view. Here, democracy 
served the growth of bureaucracy while the latter in turn 
assisted the destruction of aristocratic privilege. 
Meanwhile, the excessive proliferation of bureaucracy 
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reduced participation and a new order of authoritarianism 
set in. Simmel's tragic conception of culture was similar: 
form or organisation, the elaboration of life processes 
would bring about their eventual suffocation. Marx, more 
optimistic than Simmel saw contradiction as agent of a new 
and glorious synthesis. 
Turning his attention to the sociology of development, 
Cole remarks that while democracy is not guara nteed by 
industrialisation, it is enhanced by it. However, the 
restrictions in consumption that rapid industrialisation 
requires, brings rigid government controls which may 
increase "beyond the point where compensation can occur 
(28) 210 and the democratic structure is replaced." 
The anthropologist Leach, who analysed the political 
systems of highland Burma, gives further evidence to the 
argument for dialectics, writes Cole. He has observed 
that 
... when the increase in equality reaches 
a point where it conflicts with the 
basic aristocratic norm of higher status 
for the wife's family, then it has 
exceeded the limits within which it 
can maintain the democratic structure , 
The democratic structure is then 211 
replaced by the aristocratic structure. 
But Cole's summary of Leach lends itself to the equilibrium 
model, as much as if not more than to a dialecti cal one. 
Perhaps, he reluctantly admits, this "suggests that in some 
cases it is a problem of terminology and different starting 
. t ,,212 pOln s .. .. But this confession brings him right back to 
Dahrendorf's optional methodological perspectives which he 
earlier rejected. 
-,;I, 
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In fact, Cole's position (3b) is full of ambivalence 
and of inadequately worked out implications. He denies 
the mystifying notion of an all pervasive negativity yet, 
we find him criticising Merton for not sufficiently 
appreciating this inherent tendency. He writes of conflict 
as both an empirical and an "essential" entity, yet if he 
were a true empiricist the essential quality would have no 
logical significance for him. He claims to reject the 
teleology of dialectics, and both unilinear and cyclical 
views of change, but his tolerance for the equilibrium 
model reintroduces both teleology and cyclic change. 
Finally, under the influence of Marcuse, Cole describes 
the dialectic as counter to positivism in all its forms 
because the latter accepts only the ultimate authority of 
fact and observation, while dialectically" ... future events 
rather than the present existing fact can serve as a 
"method" of verification" (6e,16a).213 He is not only a 
confused dialectician, but when it comes to verification 
procedures, he seems to be a confused empiricist as well. 
Robert Schermerhorn, in his Comparative Ethnic Relations 
(1968)214 is another functionalist who favours dialectical 
analysis (16a). It has immense value for the social 
sCientist, he writes, because it cuts across both structural 
and dynamic perspectives without being essentially 
incompatible with either (29c). He turns to Gurvitch for 
clarification of the meaning of dialectics and finds that 
it involves: the simultaneous observation of the movement 
; 
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of both wholes and their constituent parts; focuses on 
the interpenetration of opposites in this movement (26); 
regards stable structures and fixed forms as problematic; 
and studies the character of the various dualisms that 
operate in the process of change. As a viewpoint (30b), 
that is, apart from its mediating role between system and 
conflict, the dialectic keeps the researcher aware of the 
"fluid complexities" of social situations and works against 
simplistic (including ideological) explanation (la). It 
also gives due weight to the limited perspectives of actors 
in any situation (10). The true dialectician recognises 
that in the "multiplicity" of causal chains (9), both 
predictable and unforeseen factors playa part; and 
"unlike Marx", he will not use the approach as an a priori 
means of knowing his answers in advance. "The dialectic 
is therefore a "way" of knowing suitable to continual 
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Schermerhorn's book is intended to be a contribution 
to the methodology of race relations. He describes research 
in the field as exploratory, and his own volume attempts to 
correct this by laying down some systematic foundations. 
After scanning the literature, he develops what he calls 
a set of heuristic devices after the manner of Kaplan's 
216 pattern models. These open-ended, inductive typologies, 
he suggests, should serve to generate testable propositions. 
The gradual development of the field (8a), will give rise 
to more and more studies in deductive explanation (5a), 
but these models, Schermerhorn feels, will complement, 
rather than replace, the inductive approach: 
- ... 
.. . the distinction is dialectical rather 
than dichotomous, for 'from the nature 
of the whole pattern and some of its parts 
we can deduce the others; conversely, a 
deductive relationship might itself be 
viewed as constitutive of a cognitive 
pattern. 217 
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Schermerhorn summarises the rationale of his methodology. 
The inductive typologies present the parameters which account 
for integration or conflict in relations between super and 
subordinate ethnicities (30, 21). Along one dimension the 
parameters or independent variables are the phases in these 
interactions which unfold historically; the degree of 
institutional or structural representation of groups; and 
accessibility to resources. Variables which intervene and 
modify these factors include the degree of value congruence 
between groups; the multi-national sector or cultureal 
affinity to which the society in general belongs; and 
whether or not this society is an economically or politically 
dominated totality. Along the other dimension the dependent 
variables list relative institutional participation, 
including social mobility; degree of satisfaction with 
conditions; and direct expression of conflict behaviours. 
The parameters are not mutually exclusive classifications, 
in other words, an interactive model will be called for. 
His tabulation of findings in the field does reveal 
certain regularities (5a). For instance, where the economy 
of a society is subjected to wide political supervision, he 
finds that ethnic groups are also likely to be openly 
controlled, rather than informally checked by mores. The 
author also introduces a paradigm which characterises the 
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interaction of parameters through the operation of 
centripetal and centrifugal trends, making for assimilation, 
pluralism, forced segregation and other outcomes. However, 
the crux of Schermerhorn's substantive probe into ethnic 
relations is the determination of factors related to the 
emergence of integration out of conflict (28). Examples 
of this dialectical linkage of opposites are antagonistic 
co-operations, peace in fued, and accommodati ve measures. 
Theoretically, the macro-sociological approach which 
this field demands has been based on the work of two groups; 
Lenski and Dahrendorf representing the "power-conflict" 
school, and Parsons and Levy the "systems" perspective. 
The former have tended to emphasise the autonomous identity 
of ethnicities, and the latter concentrated on the functions 
of ethnic groups in the whole, and on the adjustments by 
which such subsystems can be integrated. Schermerhorn's 
work involves a critique and synthesis of both of these, 
and he considers his solution to be a dialectical one. 
He recommends that the researcher practice an alternation 
of perspectives between dynamic and structural, diachronic 
and synchronic analysis e15a, 15b), according to the needs 
of the particular problem at hand: " ... perhaps no field 
of inquiry is better fitted to exemplify the dual relevance 
of such ostensibly clashing theories than the sphere of 
ethnic relations .,, 218 
In 1970, a group of American sociologists led by Elliot 
Grosof and including Llewellyn Gross, claimed to have 
discovered dialectical forces at work in the adaptation 
of individuals to an organisational context (29a, 30a). 
Their paper 'Anchorage in Organization' carried the 
promising sub-title 'A Dialectical Theory. ,219 
The focus of their study is described as the 
dialectical resolution of organizational 
demands and societal constraints [on low 
status workers] in which selective 
mechanisms (9) [such as restrict ed 
status achievement] mediate between 
organizational processes, cultural 220 
values and participants' strategies. 
The researchers interviewed (3a, 8a) a large group of 
hospital personnel and ranked them for social status and 
employment stability . Correlations between the two 
dimensions showed that, in every case, low status 
individuals - coloureds, females, and less educated 
males, had greater stability in employment. Apart 
from the obvious economic explanation for this low 
mobility, it was suggested that in the hospital context 
low status workers gain considerable personal reward by 
participating in culturally esteemed goals such as the 
preservation of life and mitigation of suffering (10). 
The social recognition thus achieved helps anchor these 
individuals in the organisation. 
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Inside the organisation itself three possible anchorage 
points are identified: the authority structure, co-worker 
relations and client relations (21, 22). Worker attitudes 
to employment conditions at each anchorage point were 
sampled and correlated with job satisfaction scores. 
Generalisation from this exercise (5a) led to "The theory 
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that in each anchorage system heightened attitudinal 
ambivalence is associated with stable employment." 
The most effective anchorage system was the authority 
structure. Examining low status and attitudinal ambivalence 
here, the authors found individual workers forced to resolve 
a dilemma imposed by participation in a structure at once 
"coercive and subordinating" yet "liberating and equalizing". 
This resolution was generally brought about by a combination 
of identification and submission. Workers aligned themselves 
with the authority system and created an environment of 
mutual respect and approval. Meanwhile the authority system 
gained in control, usually in inverse proportion to the 
worker's technical competence (13c, 14c). 
The authors conclude that 
Authority anchorage in hospitals is 
dialectical (16b) ... identification 
(instant submission) leads to absolute 
equality between superordinates and 
subordinates (organisational 
contradiction); submission (without 
identification) leads to absolute 222 
ressentiment (cultural contradiction). 
Paradoxically, from a functionalist viewpoint the outcome 
of authority anchorage was found to be detrimental to both 
co-worker and client interactions and hence to the prime 
organisational concern. 
R.S. Perinbanayagam's paper 'The Dialectics of Charisma' 
attempts to engage the sociology of Mead in what he calls 
"a social psychological and communicational theory" of 
charismatic leadership (1b).223 Following Bauman and not 
Trotsky's expressed opinion here, Perinbanayagam insists 
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that dialectics and pragmatism are not antagonistic. Both 
reject the notion of a static formalised universe in favour 
of a " ... processual and transient definition of reality 
(16b) ... ", furthermore, " ... both deny the adequacy of a 
formal logic based on the law of identity (17a) ... ~224 
A primary implication of this "paradigmatic task", 
the unification of dialectics and pragmatism, is that 
... a social event cannot be fully 
apprehended for purposes of analysis 
without taking full cognizance of its 
developmental nature (15a) and the 
multifarious meanings (10) it can 
mobilize. In the context, it is 
necessary to call attention to Mead's 
definition of meaning as the tendency 
of a gesture or symbol to mobilize 
coincident responses from the participants 
in a social transaction (1932a). An act 
or gesture then, receives meaning only 
when it has mobilized a particular set 
of responses. Thus Mead opens the way 
for a conceptualisation of meaning as 
an emergent variable (28) and hence 
for the creation of contradictory or 
antithetical meanings by some act or 
gesture .... Mead's perspectives allow 
one to conceive of the fundamentally 
transformative character of meaning: 
events and occurrences change their 
significance to the same audience as 
they unfold, just as much as they can 
have dissimilar meanings to different 
audiences (3b).225 
On dialectics, Perinbanayagam quotes Bosserman's 
translation of Gurvitch " ... the dialectic concerns social 
reality ... its various dimensions, expressions and 
manifestations. As a real movement the dialectic is the 
way (dia) followed or taken by human groups" Bosserman 
lists the scientific and explanatory advantages of 
dialectical sociology (6c) as permitting the study of 
unanticipated consequences, of complementarity and 
, 
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contradiction, ambiguity, opposition and the mutual 
perspectives of participants as aspects of the same 
reality (18c, 26): " ... aspects of a social whole, 
which relate to each other in such a way that both 
total identification and separation are denied. They 
are mutually immanent (14c).,,226 
Charisma is understood basically in Weber's terms, 
as a form of legitimated leadership which may bring about 
profound social change through some hold over the masses 
by persuading them to reject tradition and law. 
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Perinbanayagam puts forward his dialectics of charisma 
in four propositions: 
Charisma is "created by symbolic processes" (24) 
such as Goffmann's identity management and Burke's 
rhetorical strategies; 
these processes involve "selective and purposive 
activities" which consequently create both responsive, 
indifferent and hostile audiences; 
the possible responses may be "direct responses, 
antinomies or ambiguities"; 
the responses may "create and sustain structures 
(21) that are antithetical and inimical to each other.,,227 
He then proceeds to exemplify this theory wi th a reconstruction 
of the career of Gandhi (30a). 
Gandhi deliberately projected the enhanced identity 
of the sadhu or ascetic Hindu holy-man using such rhetorical 
instruments as the loin cloth and fasting. Likewise the 
spinning wheel was his symbol of Indian integrity v rsus 
British economic exploitation. With death a possible 
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outcome of the fast, the latter held claim to sainthood, 
and so the practice evolved into a contest between good 
and evil - one frail, dedicated man against the British 
government. When Gandhi's demands were won, this identity 
was validated. 
Perinbanayagam points out that basically the appeal 
of the sadhu, non-violence and the sacredness of the cow, 
depended on evocation and crystallization of deep buried 
Hindu traditions. It was not a total ideological consensus 
however. Although his plea for Hindu-Moslem unity brought 
him favour with the Moslems, his intransigent commitment 
to the sacred cow aroused their hostility, so did his 
advocacy of representative government, which left them 
uncertain about their future. Meanwhile the extreme 
orthodox Hindus of North India were also opposed to Gandhi 
on the question of representative government because he 
was seen by them , as too lenient to the Moslems. It is 
also probable that many high government officials, tired 
of his continual political interference were not adverse 
to his eventual elimination. 
Perinbanayagam concludes 
... the very processes that created his 
charismatic appeal, also created antinomous 
audiences which often saw him in terms of 
what could be termed counter-charisma, or 
as Burke (1962) puts it 'scapegoat' ... it 
was inevitable that the same processes 
that created the charisma of Gandhi should 
create antithetical structures (groups, 
classes, individuals and institutions, 
etc.). Charisma emerges in a field of 
conflict and contradictions and so is 
sustained (29c). 228 
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Writing on 'Dialectic and Sociology' for the American 
Sociological Review 1971, Louis Schneider recognises a 
"dialectical bent" active in sociological thinking for 
over two hundred years; but the multiplicity of meanings 
given the term, he feels, has prevented consideration of 
this as a workable scheme . 229 To talk of a dialectical 
"method" is thus quite absurd, writes Sc hneider, Hegel's 
own dialectic was "at the most a method of exposition .... 
Dialectical 'bias' or 'bent' or 'perspective' is quite a 
different matter from method" (30b).230 Schneider warns 
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that dialectical argument has often used the terms negation 
and contradiction in contexts beyond the logical system in 
which they were developed, and that invariably such writing 
falls to the level of "word mongering". Nor has dialectics 
been disciplined by alliance to anyone system of philosophy , 
he reflects (lb). 
Schneider separates six strains of meaning that 
predominate in dialectical thinking , the seventh that he 
adds is really elaboration of an earlier one. The first 
of these strains has to do with discrepancies between aim 
or intention and the outcome of social action. This was 
a significant element in Hegel's perception of history, 
the 18th century Scottish Moralists recognised it, Spencer 
too is listed as acknowledging that "conditions and not 
intentions determine" (13b, 16b). Merton in 1936, discussing 
the "unanticipated consequences of purposive social action" 
found Marx , Wundt, Pareto and Weber, to be aware of the 
problem, and MacIver has also interested himself with it. 231 
... 
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The second meaning cluster Schneider names, following 
Wundt, is "the heterogony of ends". It describes a process 
whereby unintended outcomes are absorbed into new intentions 
or old means become new ends (28). The psychologist Allport's 
"functional autonomy of motives" or Adam Smith's view that 
economic greed may be found at the base of general welfare, 
are cases in point, reflecting this "irony of sudden 
reversals".232 
Schneider's third category follows on from the second, 
but deals with evolutionary progression, where one stage of 
adaptation may prove inimical to further advance - success 
thus bringing failure . As Spencer observed, organisation 
favours growth only to a certain point of complexity after 
which it impedes it. Weber too, discussing the dependence 
of bureaucracy on technological superiority has remarked 
that there can be evolutionary advantages in backwardness. 
Or again, the successful practice of the puritan ascetic 
and work ethic leads straight into the temptations of 
wealth; while for the Marxist, the successful accumulation 
of surplus value brings about the fall of the capitalist 
system. Schneider himself points to modern urban planning, 
where a highway built to relieve traffic congestion is as 
often as not found to be increasing it. Modifications to 
a system may be positive in outcome as well as negative, 
although the original "Hegelian negation" implied a "lifting 
up" (21, 27). 
A fourth aspect of dialectics treats of development 
through conflict, this is perhaps its most commonly known 
L' 
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feature and he sees it as the one which leave it most open 
to attack from those who do not appreciate the mechanisms 
involved (26, 27, 28), 
The fifth group of meanings to be isolated focuses 
on these mechanisms, particularly "contradiction" and its 
corollaries opposition, paradox, negation, dilemma. 
Schneider mentions the dilemmas posed by "charisma" in 
Weber's theory; psychoanalysis abounds in such turns; 
"the contradictory logic of passion" is Schneider's 
favourite phrase for it (18a). 
The final cluster surrounds the problem of conflict 
resolution through dialectical coalescence of opposites 
(26, 29b). Simmel's recognition that antagonism among 
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those with close ties is always more intense than antagonism 
among those without affection for each other, is an example 
of this. 
In all its meanings the "dialectical bent" expresses 
"paradox" and "the irony of sudden reversals". Schneider 
believes it will have useful application in discriminating 
between types of social change and that it should provoke 
reassessment of the notion of feedback. The most he will 
say for its status however, is that it promises "a shrewd 
233 taxonomy". 
Peter Blau was interested in the dialectical idea as early 
as 1964. In the last chapter of his book Exchange and 
Power in Social Life he wrote "There is a dialectic in 
social life (16b), for it is governed by many contradictory 
- ... 
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forces. The dilemmas of social associations reflect this 
dialectic, and so does the character of social change. ,,234 
He illustrated the theme with an analysis of the 
relationship between reciprocity and imbalance: 
Reciprocity equilibrates, giving is 
balanced by obligation, but where 
reciprocation is not possible an 
imbalance of power results. A 
secondary exchange is thus super-
imposed upon the first. Power, in 
turn, is moderated by the degree 
of social approval it receives. Too 
heavy exercise of power meets with 
disapproval. However, the total 
acceptance of power by subordinates 
legitimates it and reinforces the 
imbalance. Conversely, collective 
disapproval threatens stability 
through the creation of opposition. 
The multiple consequences of a 
social force are another reason 
it may have contradictory repercussions 
in the social structure. The forces 
set in motion to restore equilibrium 
in one respect, or in one segment of 
the social structure, are typically 
disequilibrating forces in other 
respects, or in other segments . ... 
Many incompatible requirements exist 
in complex social structures ... (and) 
there is much resistance to social 
change . .. Btructural change, therefore, 
assumes a dialectical pattern (27).235 
In 1972 Blau was again associating himself with the 
dialectic . At a meeting of graduate students at Colombia 
University, among them Karmen, and in the presence of 
Robert Merton, he took up the issue of 'Functionalism 
and Dialectics' and defended a variety of the latter. 236 
It is plain from the published summary of his 
contribution to the discussion that Blau's theoretical 
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orientation continues to fall clear of the Marxist line C1a), 
He recognises dialectics and functionalism as two 
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complementary heuristi c perspectives (30b) because the 
first "focuses on the issues and dilemmas posed by the 
conflicting interests of different groups" and the second 
"focuses on the adjustment and integration of various 
groups and interests" (21,29a).237 
Blau departs from the main body of opinion at the 
meeting over this, (as most see the two as incompatible 
epistemologies) and over the question of evaluative 
criteria for theories. Explanation and prediction are 
essential corollaries of adequate theorizing, he agrees, 
but he rejects the contention that a theory should impel 
to social action - look at the case of Hitler. 
In the new statement on dialectics, "dilemma" is 
still Blau's key theoretical notion. He defines it as 
a contradiction (18a) not resolvable under existing social 
conditions. This is what makes it an important "dynamic 
force" - an emergent concept (28). He realises that 
" ... whether a conflict or difficulty is looked upon as 
a mere social problem or tenSion in need of adjustment, 
or as an unresolvable dilemma with dynamic potential, 
238 depends on ones conceptual framework". Marx's was 
a framework for social change, he comments, but he sees 
his own as more appropriate to a detached theoretical 
analysis that allows consideration of both sides of a 
social conflict. 
It is not a profound conSidered viewpoint. 
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ANALYTIC SUMMARY FUNCTIONALIST DIALECTICS 
Earadi~atic features Gurv/Caza/Berg/Cole/Sche/Gros/Peri/Schn/Blau 
la no philos. align. x x x x 
b non Marxist philos x x 
c Hegel-early Marx 
d philos.late Marx 
2a unified science 
b soc. method distn. x 
3a objectivist meta. x x x x 
b relativist meta . x 
c essentialist meta x 
4a soc. value free 
b soc. committed 
Sa soc. nomothetic x x x 
b soc. idiographic 
c both complement 
6a expl.deductive x 
b expl.probabilistic x x 
c expl. functional 
d expl.genetic 
e expl.dialectical x x 
7a expl . -prediction 
b expl./descr.-undst. x 
c undst. -action (c.r. ) 
8a method empirical x x x x x 
b method hermeneutic 
c both complement x x 
9 analyses causal x x x x x 
10 analyses seek reasons x x x 
11 analyses seek immanent 
12 latent v.manifest m. 
13a determinism subj/obj 
b determinism obj/subj x 
c determ . reciprocal x x x 
14a determinism whole/part x x 
b determinism part/whole 
c determ.reciprocal x x x x x 
15a analyses diachronic x x 
b analyses synchronic 
c both complement x x 
16a dia. is method x x x 
b dia. is reality x x x x x x 
c dia.is meth.& reality 
d dia.is interaction m.r. x 
17a rejects formal logic x x 
b uses formal logic x 
18a dia.simple contrad. x x 
b dia.multiple contrad x x 
c dia. other factor x x 
19 physical dia. 
20 production dia. 
21 institutional dia. x x x x x x x x x 
22 intersubjective dia. i x x 
23 intrasubjective dia . x 
24 cognitive dia. x x 
25 structural (infra) dia. 
26 uses law int. of opp. x x x x x 
27 uses law neg.of neg. x x x 
28 uses law of emergence x x x x x x 
29a uses systems model x x 
b uses conflict model x 
c both complement x x x x x x x 
30a applies dia. (exemplar) x x x 
b perspective only x x x x x 
-
Comments on the Summaries 
The functionalist dialecticians overlap on three points _ 
the focus on a dialectic in reality itself ; which 
operates at the institutional level and commitment to 
a complementarity of systems and conflict models. 
The so called 'structuralist' Gurvitch is classified 
here as a functionalist because of his emphasis on the 
objective facticity of the social whole and his freedom 
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from any commitment to immanent or latent forces. His 
uncompromising systems orientation is difficult to reconcile 
with the complementarity dialectic of reciprocity, ambiguity , 
etc. His entertainment of synchronic and diachronic 
perspectives is problematic, since social reality is seen 
by him as ongoing and continuous (diachronic) while the 
sociological method is a static or (synchronic) analysis. 
Again he appears to conceptualise the dialectic as method, 
as reality and as interaction, separately. 
Cazaneuve's contribution is too brief for critical 
comment. 
Cole confuses the objectivist and essentialist 
epistemologies at times; 
and synchronic analysis 
or reality. 
is undecided between diachronic 
and a dialectic that is method 
Schermerhorn is interested in both reasons and causes 
for action - these are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
but the objectivist epistemology is definitely not compatible 
with the notion of reciprocity. 
Grosof et.al. make this mistake as well. 
Perinbanayagam starts off with a pragmatic relativist 
stance and ends up with an objective systems model growing 
out of it. 
Schneider does not put forward an explicit position , 
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but rather describes some cardinal features of the dialectic . 
No particular inconsistencies are apparent in what he says. 
Blau's statement again is an incomplete one, but several 
points do not resolve - he rejects any philosophical align-
ment but asserts that the dialectic is a 'real' phenomenon. 
He blends system and reciprocity in the Marxist style , but 
rejects identification as a Marxist. 
CONCLUSION 
The reader is now in a position to evaluate Friedrichs' 
argument for a dialectical paradigm. 
the logical consistency of Friedrichs' claim 
149. 
Towards the end of A Sociology of Socio logy he writes: 
"If the dialectic does not seriously challenge conflict 
and system for paradigmatic status during the 1970's, it 
will not be because of inadequate formal credentials.,,239 
What are these formal credentials? Is the paradigm that 
he projects a logically consistent proposition? 
A prime characteristic of Friedrichs' "dialectical 
paradigm" is its open structure allowing a "dialogical" 
complementarity of perspectives and procedures to operate 
within its ambit. 
The paradigm is said to be supported by the polarity 
of many sets of concepts in sociology and their 
interpenetration; by a reflexive logic, "probably Hegelian" 
which rationalises this; by the possibility of the negation 
of a current phase of social reality and emergence of a new 
phase in "a relationship between the qualitative and the 
quantitative akin to that found in Marxist theory". 
A consequence of all this, is a reflexive sociology 
where a self-conscious sociologist is inevitably involved 
in the social situation he studies; where knowledge has 
become an independent variable; where all research is by 
definition action research and its goal is the social 
emancipation of those involved. 
The final consequence of the reflexive sociology in 
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which knowledge is an active variable, is the unpredictability 
of social events and hence, the inappropriateness of any 
search for generalizing statements or sociological laws. 
One might argue, following Kuhn, that Friedrichs' 
dialectical paradigm with its epistemological pluralism 
is by definition no paradigm at all. And, that by inventing 
this complementarity argument he is both having his cake 
and eating it. Whether or not one believes that his revision 
of the theory of paradigms is justifiable, the concession 
to the complementarity of nomothetic and idiographic, of 
systems and conflict, empiricism and hermeneutics , does 
introduce logical difficulties. 
Systems theory and its manifestations in structuralism 
and functionalism, are based on a metaphysical assumotion 
of the stability and objective facticity of their data. It 
follows that empirical methods are considered appropriate 
to the study of these and that law-like generalizations are 
expected to emerge from this study. In short, it transposes 
a model of natural scientific activity into the social sphere. 
Friedrichs writes however, that "System theory, presuming 
conceptual closure, violates the openess of dialectical 
theory" which his elaboration of reciprocity and inter-
penetration, negation and emergence, self-consciousness 
and emancipation, is an impressive monument to. Furthermore, 
he believes that " ... the search for 'laws' of human nature 
.. ~ 
and for fundamental social processes that are in principle 
stable, is ultimately destined to be futile,,241 because 
Whenever a social scientist does isolate 
a specific manifestation of order in the 
social world, his awareness of that order 
represents an e ntirely new factor in that 
world and will feed back through his own 
actions and the actions of those to whom 
he communicates that awareness, to deny 
to some degree the full validity of that 
order in the future.242 
In fact, he states quite plainly concerning the methods 
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of natural and social sCience, that "the nature of their 
fundamental disparity is the central message of my book. ,,243 
His summary stock taking of the thesis put forward 
in A Sociology of Sociology takes up the complementarity 
argument again, and here he maintains that while the term 
... "dialectical" has traditionally been 
used to characterise the nature of a 
single logic .... A crucial characteristic 
of the present formulation ... is that it 
seeks to engage two gUite distinct 
epistemologies ... the two predispositions 
- the one suitable to the concern for 
reliability evidenced by natural science 
and the other appropriate to the risk 
demanded by a sensitivity to the ground 
that is personal existence - must inform 
each other .... 244 
The competing "frames of discourse" are more than mere 
alternatives, for at "another level" they can be seen to 
be "nested frames". And, of this "nested hierarchy of 
lenses", one is "artificial and one given ... ,., 245 
Thus, the sophist concludes that the dialectical 
paradigm " ... does not reflect a metaphysical or ontological 
daulism of any sort: 
referent, is o n e . ,,246 
[for] experience, its grounding 
Friedrichs should not need to be reminded however, 
that 'raw' experience, whatever it may be, is certainly 
-=-.- -
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ANALYTICAL SUMMARY DIALECTICAL SCHOOLS 
2aradi2!atic features Herm Crit Refl Marx ~ Funct 
1a no philos.align. 1 1 4 
b non Marxist philos. 1 1 2 
c Hegel-early Marx 2 1 
d philos.late Marx 
..! ..! 
2a unified science 1 1 
b soc.method dist. 1 2- ..1.. 1 
3a objectivist meta. 2 1 4 
b relativist meta. 1 1 1 
c essentialist meta. 1 1 1 2 1 
4a soc. value free 1 1 
b soc. committed 
..i. 3 
Sa soc. nomothetic 1 1 1 2 3 
b soc. idiographic 1 1 
c both complement 
6a expl.deductive 1 
b expl.probabilistic 2 
c expl. functional 
d expl. genetic 
e expl.dialectical 2 1 2 
7a expl. -prediction 1 
b expl./descr.-undst. ~ 1 1 
c undst. -action (c.r. ) 3 
8a method empirical 1 5 
b method hermeneutic 1 2 2 2. 
c both complement 1 2 1 . 2 
9 analyses causal 1 1 5 
10 analyses seek reasons 1 2 2 3 
11 analyses seek immanent 2 1 
~2 latent v. manifest m. 1 3 2 3 
13a determinism subj/obj 2 l' 
b determinism obj/subj 1 1 
c determ.reciprocal 2 3 3 
14a determ.whole/part 2 1 2 2 
b determ.part/whole 
c determ.reciprocal 1 2 5 
15a analyses diachronic 
..1. 2- ..l 1 2 
b analyses synchronic 2 
c both complement 2 
16a dia.is method 
.l. 3 
b dia.is reality .§. 
c dia.is meth. & reality ~ ..! 
d dia.is interaction m.r. 
..1.. 2- 1 
17a rejects formal logic 1 3 1 2 2 
b uses formal logic 1 1 
18a dia. simple contrad. 1 
..! 2 2 
b multiple contrad. 2 2 
c other factor 2 
19 physical dia. 1 
20 production dia. 1 1 1 1 
21 institutional dia. 2 2 1 
.1. ~ 
22 intersubjective dia. + 3 
23 intrasubjective dia. 1 "2 1 1 
24 cognitive dia. ~ J, 1 ~ 
25 structural (infra) dia. 2 1 1 
26 uses law into of op .. 1 1 1 1- .1 
27 uses law neg.ofneg. 1 1.. 2 3 
28 uses law of emergence 1 1.. 1 .§. 
29a uses systems model 1 1 1 1 2 
b uses conflict model 1 1 
c both complement 1 1 ~ 
30a applies dia.-(exemplar) 1 2 1 3 
b perspective only 1.- .i ~ k 5 
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not what Kuhn meant by the term 'paradigm'. Unfortunately, 
Friedrichs' "dialectical paradigm" does exhibit logical 
shortcomings. 
the empirical feasibility of Friedrichs' claim 
The measure of Friedrichs' thesis against the actual 
output of dialectical writing reviewed depends on two 
inquiries: does the body of literature share a common 
paradigm? And, if so, how do the properties of this 
paradigm compare with Friedrichs projection? 
Judging from the dispersion of relevant publications 
since 1960, the high points in dialectical writing have 
been 1966 and 1970, with 1971 and 1972 following up.247 
After this, there is a sharp drop in the interest of 
sociologists in dialectics. If this trend continues 
into the Seventies then Friedrichs' projection will 
be demonstrated to have been misconceived, at least as 
far as its timing goes, At the time of writing the 
evidence weighs against Friedrichs on this point. 
The material on which the present empirical assess-
ment is based is summarised in the matrix entitled _ 
Dialectical Schools. 
The criteria on which the assessment is based are, 
to recapitulate: 
an item is considered representative of a given 
group of dialecticians if two thirds of the authors in 
that group acknowledge it. 
in r e d on the matrix.) 
(These items are underlined 
If a representative item is shared by two thirds of 
the groups, then it is interpreted as a paradigmatic 
feature. 
matrix .) 
(These items are underlined in blue on the 
If two-thirds of the total number of items listed 
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on the analytic frame are paradigmatic features, so defined, 
then a common paradigm will be said to be present. 
In general the writing can be describ ed as falling 
into a continuum of clusters ranging from the 'soft' 
dialecticians - hermeneutic, critical and reflexive schools 
oriented around the subjective and the 'hard' dialecticians 
- Marxists, structuralists and functionalists who reach for 
an objectivity of some sort. The relationships are more 
complex than this conventional dualism would suggest however, 
for there is also a third element running through the matrix 
not readily identified with either poles, and this is the 
essentialism expressed by many of the authors. 
Looking at the representative items of the various 
schools it is apparent that the critical and reflexive 
sociologies are in many respects scarcely distinct, and 
similarly the Marxists and structuralists agree on several 
items. The two clusters dominated by American sociology _ 
hermeneutics and functionalism - are quite literally poles 
apart. 
As for the paradigmatic features, there is fundamental 
agreement on only two points; the dialectic is a cognitive 
phenomenon (24) and a perspective (30b). The first inquiry 
must be answered in the negative. 
There is no paradigm, but what are the trends 
contained in the writing? The analytic frame contains 
sixty-two items filled out by ratings on twenty-eight 
authors. The lack of overall relatedness is again under-
lined by the fact that only five of these items are 
acknowledged by more than half of the authors. That is, 
they receive a total of fourteen or mor e ratings across 
the six groups. An examination of these it ems according 
to the number of ratings received across groups, suggests 
a dialectic that is highly consistent with the orthodox 
Marxist position on all but three items. 
paradigmatic features 
30b 
21 
24 
15a 
26 
27 
28 
2b 
8b 
16d 
17a 
18a 
14c 
3c 
12 
perspective only 
institutional dia. 
cognitive dia. 
analyses diachronic 
uses law into of opp. 
uses law neg. of neg. 
uses law of emergence 
soc. method distn. 
method hermeneutic 
dia. is interaction m.r. 
rejects formal logic 
dia. simple contrad. 
reciprocal whole/part 
essentialist meta, 
latent v. manifest m. 
ratings 
18 
18 
16 
15 
14 
11 
11 
11 
11 
10 
10 
10 
10 
9 
9 
Two of these, 2b and 16d, are heavily weighted by the 
reflexive dialecticians, and a third, 12, is weighted by 
all but the present sample of Marxists and functionalists 
for some obscure reason. 
A dialectical paradigm based on this 'latent image' 
would be a theoretical perspective and not a practical 
model or exemplar. It would focus on phenomena at the 
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institutional level and there would be an interaction of 
this substantive concern and the method used, in other 
words a cognitive dialectic of understanding would permit 
an interaction of method and reality. This interactive 
aspect would involve the sociologist in the flux of social 
reality, a diachronic perspective, to be distinguished in 
methodology from that of the exact sciences. The engagement 
of sociological hermeneutic with institutional order would 
introduce the possibility of contradiction of that order _ 
this being the motive force of change. The cognition of 
the dialectician and the institutional order, representing 
part and whole respectively, would be reciprocally determining 
factors and the three laws of dialectics would describe 
phases of this emergent interactive process, a sociology 
transcending the rules of formal logic. This paradigm, 
based on the continuing emergence or manifestation of meaning 
that was latent until the application of sociological under-
standing to the institutional order, would thus be grounded 
in an essentialist metaphysic. 
Juxtaposing this hypothetical composite of trends 
against Friedrichs' scheme, all but three of the fifteen 
features are found to coincide with twelve of Friedrichs' 
twenty-six items. (These items are marked by an x on the 
analytic summary of Friedrichs position.) 
The latent paradigm does not reproduce Friedrichs' 
problematic complementarity theme, while Friedrichs does 
not refer to an institutional dialectic (21), to a purely 
hermeneutic method (8b) or to the existence of latent and 
manifest meaning (12). 
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Anal ytic s ummary of Fri edr i chs' posit i o n 
paradigmatic features paradigmatic features 
1c Hegel-early Marx 14b determinism part/whole x 2b soc. method distn. x c determ. reciprocal 3b relativist meta. x 15a analyses diachronic x c essentialist meta. x 16d dia. is interaction m.r. 4b soc. committed x 17a rejects formal logic 5c nomos/idios campI. x 18a dia. simple contrad. 6e expl. dialectical 22 intersubjective dia. 7c undst.-action (c. r. ) x 24 cognitive dia. 8c emp/herm compl . x 26 uses law into of opp. 10 analyses seek reasons x 27 uses law neg. of neg. 11 analyses seek immanent x 28 uses law of emergence 13a determinism subj/obj 29c sys t/confl compl. 
c determ. reciprocal x 30b perspective only 
The latent paradigm of course, is generat e d from only 
the fifteen most rated or recurrent items for all authors 
and is in no sense a fully developed statement on the 
dialectic. Furthermore, the set of features contained in 
it does not resist distortion by the addition of new 
information. The comparison with Friedrichs' " paradigm" 
is merely a heuristic exercise, and does not bear on the 
empirical feasibility of Friedrichs' claim in any way. 
The empirical feasibility of Friedrichs' thesis 
cannot be upheld. Not only does contemporary dialectical 
writing in sociology fall into several distinct intellec tual 
traditions, which are metaphysically and epistemologically 
incompatible, but incompatibilities exist even among the 
authors within these several groups. Beyond this, as the 
chapter summaries reveal, there are logical inconsistencies 
over dialectics within the thinking of the individual 
authors themselves. 
The image of the dialectic that emerges from the 
present review of the literature falls well short of the 
status of 'paradigm'. 
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the wider context 
The introspective attitude in sociology in recent 
years has frequently resorted to the metasystem provided 
by Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). 
The paradigm debate that began with Friedrichs' A Sociology 
of Sociology (1970) and Gouldner's The Coming Crisis of 
Western Sociology (1970) has been carried forward by Mullins' 
Theories and Theory Groups in Contemporary American 
Sociology (1973), by Effrat's 'Power to the Paradigms' 
(1973) and by Ritzer's 'Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm 
Science' (1975). Each of these authors argues against 
the domination of sociology by anyone paradigm and the 
dialectic is not given particular credence, although 
Mullins and Ritzer do acknowledge the potentially 
paradigmatic status of critical theory. 
Mullins approach to the genesis of paradigmatic 
styles - a sociometric one - is unique and grounded in 
thorough investigation. On the whole though, the calibre 
of the paradigm debate has been unimpressive. Effrat has 
tended to confuse paradigms with theories and as a result 
has identified a plethora of these operative within the 
discipline - symbolic interactionist, exchange, phenomeno-
logical, ethnomethodological, Marxian, Durkheimian, 
Freudian, Weberian and Parsonian. Ritzer's more parsimonious 
analysis has isolated three major styles - one preoccupied 
with ~ocial 'facts', another with 'definitions' and a third 
'behavioural' paradigm. Ritzer contends that he has at 
last given formulation to the elusive term 'paradigm', but 
the four 'component parts' that he distinguishes - the 
exemplar, image of the subject matter, theory, method and 
instruments, are each interdependent phases of theory, so 
this is no real advance on the earlier efforts. 
The present exercise articulates a paradigmatic 
framework based on a comprehensive set of epistemological 
alternatives. It holds the substantive theory constant 
against this frame for assessment by a tec h ni que adapted 
from quantitative taxonomy. It is thus structured in such 
a way that an empirical evaluation of the theoretical 
issues is made possible. The method is illustrated by 
testing Friedrichs' case for the dialectical paradigm 
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and Friedrichs' hypothesis is demonstrated to be unfounded. 
In short, the thesis, by devising an instrument for determining 
the paradigmatic character of sociological writing sets the 
stage for relocation of the paradigm debate at a more 
fundamental level of discourse. 
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